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Summary 
In light of what have become known as the European migration crisis, this thesis 
examines the legality of one of EU’s burden-sharing responses to this perceived 
threat – the EU/Turkey deal on March 18 2016.  
For many asylum seekers, the dream of a safe haven in the EU goes through 
Turkey to the Greek islands, leading to a significant rise in the number of would-be 
asylum seekers in the EU over the last years. Tragically, many have died making this 
crossing. For those who made it, the present deal enables their return back to Turkey.  
The arrangement has been criticized as contrary to the international legal framework, 
particularly of the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, and because it 
undermines the individual's right to seek asylum. This thesis focuses on an 
assessment of the current legal framework – primary the Refugee Convention, the 
ECHR and EU law - to identify the EU member states’ obligations under these 
rights.  
From the understandings drawn from this legal assessment, I conclude that 
international law doesn’t in principle hinder a member state from returning a 
protection seeker without a substantive examination of his/hers protection claim. I 
further derive that, for the EU/Turkey deal to be legal, much depends on the 
protection seekers access to efficient asylum procedures and whether Turkey satisfies 
the “safe third country” criteria under the Asylum Procedures Directive. An in depth 
examination of the legal and the de facto situation in Turkey is therefore provided 
for, asking myself – is Turkey actually safe for return?  
In sum, the technical content of the EU/Turkey deal does not provide anything 
that falls short of the international standards examined in this thesis. However, in 
light of the worrying picture painted of the de facto situation for asylum seekers in 
Turkey – I doubt it being legal sending someone back there today.  
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Sammanfattning 
Med avstamp i den så kallade migrationskrisen i Europa, undersöker denna uppsats 
huruvida en av EUs åtgärder för att hantera detta hot – EU/Turkiet uppgörelsen den 
18 mars 2016 – är förenlig med internationell folkrätt.   
Många asylsökande drömmer om en fristad i Europa, en dröm som många 
gånger innebär en resa via Turkiet till de grekiska öarna i Medelhavet. Denna rutt har 
de senaste åren fört med sig en kraftig ökning av antalet potentiella asylsökande i 
EU. Tragiskt nog har många mist sitt liv på vägen. För de som klarade sig med livet i 
behåll, innebär den aktuella uppgörelsen att det är möjligt att skicka dem tillbaka till 
Turkiet när de anländer till EU.    
EU/Turkiet uppgörelsen har kritiserats för att strida mot internationell rätt, i 
synnerhet den grundläggande principen om non-refoulement, och att den 
underminerar en individs rätt att söka asyl.  
Denna uppsats syftar till att kartlägga vilka förpliktelser som finns i 
förhållande till nämnda rättigheter för EUs medlemsstater – främst med fokus på 
Flyktingkonventionen, EKMR och relevant EU-rätt. 
I uppsatsen dras slutsatsen att folkrätten principiellt inte hindrar en 
medlemsstat från att skicka tillbaka en asylsökande utan en materiell bedömning av 
hens ansökan. För att avgöra huruvida EU/Turkiet uppgörelsen är förenlig med 
folkrätten som undersökts, måste en bedömning göras om personen i fråga fått 
tillgång till ett effektivt ansökningsförfarande, samt om Turkiet uppfyller kriterierna 
för ett “säkert tredjeland” under Europaparlamentets och Rådets Direktiv om 
Gemensamma Förfaranden för att Bevilja och Återkalla Internationellt Skydd.  
För att uppfylla syftet med uppsatsen och avgöra om Turkiet är säkert att sända 
tillbaka asylsökande till, görs en bedömning av rättsläget i Turkiet - både i relation 
till relevant lagstiftning och samhällssituationen i stort.   
Sammanfattningsvis dras slutsatsen att EU/Turkiet uppgörelsen i sig är förenlig 
med de folkrättsstandards som undersökts. Hur som helst, den bild som målas upp av 
situationen för asylsökanden i Turkiet idag, får mig att ifrågasätta lagenligheten av 
uppgörelsen vid ett rent faktiskt genomförande.  
 7 
Preface 
I have learnt so many things during the process of this study. I would like to take the 
opportunity to thank my family for their huge support during this semester, 
especially to Pedro and Amy – obrigada. Also, I would heartily like to thank 
Vladislava, who has been of great assistance and whose comments resulted in great 
improvements of this thesis.  
 8 
Abbreviations 
Note on terminology: All individuals arriving in the EU not having entered through 
regular legal channels are deemed ‘irregular migrants’. Some may be refugees and 
asylum seekers and some may not be. A refugee is someone fleeing persecution on 
grounds set out in the Refugee Convention, and additionally the EU Qualification 
Directive provides that those at risk of ‘serious harm are to be provided international 
protection on a similar basis as those subject to persecution. An asylum seeker or 
protection seeker is someone claiming to be a refugee or eligible for subsidiary 
protection but whose status the authorities have not yet determined. A third country 
or intermediate country is the country where the asylum or protection seeker is 
returned to, which is not his/hers country of origin.  
 
APD    Procedures Directive (2013/32) 
CAT Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
CEAS    Common European Asylum System  
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union 
Commission  European Commission 
ECHR   European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR   European Court on Human Rights  
ECRE   European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
EU   European Union 
EU Charter   Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
EXCOM  Executive Committee of the Programme of the High 
Commissioner 
HRC    Human Rights Committee 
HRW   Human Rights Watch  
ICCPR    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
LFIP   Law of Foreigners and International Protection (2013/6458) 
NGO   Non-governmental organisation 
Refugee Convention Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
QD   Qualification Directive (2011/95) 
TEU   Treaty on European Union 
TFEU    Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
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UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
VCLT   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction  
For centuries, people have been forced to flee their homes because of conflict, 
political, racial and religious persecutions, natural disasters and inhuman treatment 
occurring in their societies. However, last year over a million potential asylum 
seekers arrived in Europe, many fleeing the civil war in Syria. 1 Its no doubt that 
Europe and the European Union (EU) is considered as a sanctuary by a growing 
number of people fleeing from what appear to be, and many times are, intolerable 
conditions in their societies.  
Nevertheless, the EU, the richest political block in the world, has actively 
sought to prevent protection seekers from accessing its territory and asylum 
procedures. In what have been dubbed “Fortress Europe” policies, the EU has i.e. 
struck deals with neighbouring countries to keep people out, often with people’s life 
at stake when they are forced to pursue irregular journeys by land or sea. More than 
3700 persons were reported missing in the Mediterranean sea 2015, probably 
drowned. 2 
The question of who should bear responsibility for the new arrivals and how 
those obligations and burdens should be shared generated very different policy 
responses among EU member states, with many prioritizing national interests over 
European solidarity. Practices such as turning back or transferring to non-European 
coastal states, which fail to comply with international human rights standards, have 
been highly criticized for prioritizing security at the expense of protection. This 
responses generated fierce political debates over legal and normative obligations to 
the displaced within and across member states. Fears of irregular (mass) migration 
can undermine the values and human rights norms they are committed to uphold.  
This approach is reflected in the use of readmission agreements concluded 
between EU and other countries. Concerning the removal of persons who don’t fulfil 
the conditions to stay in the territory, they are an important part of the EU’s 
migration policies. The current refugee crisis has brought the issue of readmission up 
for debate when a new phase in the EU-Turkey relationship was launched on the 18 
March 2016 (“The EU/Turkey deal”). EU and Turkey agreed on a far-reaching 
migration control deal where decisive action was taken by European leaders to 
                                                
1 Eurostat, Asylum applicants in the EU 
2 UNHCR, Clayton & Holland, Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015 (30 Dec 
2015) 
 11 
“break the cycle of uncontrolled flows of migrants creating an unsustainable 
humanitarian crisis”. The goal was to remove the incentive for migrants and asylum 
seekers to seek irregular routes to the EU, through a combination of action as close as 
possible to the entry point into the EU - in the Greek islands - and close cooperation 
between the EU and Turkey.3  
There have been observers claiming that the EU concluded this deal with “their 
backs seemingly against the wall, and in an atmosphere of palpable panic”.4 Turkish 
officials – including president Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself - are cited numerous 
times making blunt threats with the refugees as a political weapon: “We do not have 
the word “idiot” written on our foreheads. We will be patient but we will do what we 
have to do. Don’t think that the planes and the buses are there for nothing”. The 
president had earlier threatened European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker at the G20 meeting in Antalya, implying that Turkey could send refugees to 
Europe and “open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and put the refugees on 
buses”. He confirmed his statements in a speech thereafter: “I am proud of what I 
said. We have defended the rights of Turkey and the refugees. And we told them (the 
Europeans): “Sorry, we will open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants”.5  
As Europe desperately needed Turkey to serve as a migrant waiting room on 
its borders, as claimed by one author,6 EU member states seemed increasingly 
willing to negotiate with Turkey as the migrants kept entering the EU. Ultimately, 
when the EU was no longer able to bribe Turkey, it acceded to a number of what 
earlier had been called  “blackmailing” Turkish demands.7  
Consequently, EU and Turkey agreed on a deal, inter alia permitting Greece to 
return to Turkey “all new irregular migrants” arriving after March 20 2016, and EU 
agreed to assist Turkey with more than six billion Euros in financial support and 
resettlement of Syrian refugees in the EU.8 
Importantly, the effect of the EU/Turkey deal meant that the EU as a whole 
agreed to recognize and treat Turkey as a safe country for return of protection seekers 
- despite serious and repeatedly human rights violations by the government observed 
                                                
3 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the European Council and the Council, First Report on the Progress made in the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 231 Final, Brussels, (20 April 
2016).  
4 Collet, The paradox of the EU-Turkey deal, Migration Policy Institue.org, (March 2016). 
5 Turkisk president threatens to send millions of Syrian refugees to EU, The Guardian, (11 
February 2016). 
6 Wilczek, When the EU is no longer able to bribe Turkey, the blackmail will begin, The 
Spectator, (4 March 2016). 
7 ibid. 
8 European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, (18 March 2016). 
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by NGOs.9 As the events this summer revealed, Turkey is moving completely in the 
wrong direction – from democracy to creeping authoritarianism.  
 
1.1 Subject and aim   
Readmission agreements raise two key issues in international law. One issue is 
whether such agreements are consistent with the obligation of non-refoulement, 
which prohibits return to a place where persecution or serious harm is feared, 
whether it is the country of origin or not. The second issue is the extent to which any 
and every state is obliged to examine the substance of an asylum request. This thesis 
is basically premised on the idea that refugee protection cannot be regarded as 
present, without guaranteeing effective access to asylum and prohibition on 
refoulement. In light of this, this thesis aspires to analyse the extent of refugee 
protection under the recent EU/Turkey deal in relation to these rights. The present 
thesis is basically making an account of the legality and discusses possible fallouts of 
the EU/Turkey readmission deal from an international human rights perspective, 
focusing on the rights to seek asylum and to non-refoulement.  
In order to fulfil the purpose of the study, I will try to answer following 
research questions: 
 
- What is the content and scope of the right not to be subjected to refoulement? 
- What is the content and scope of the right to seek asylum and how is it 
related to non-refoulement?  
- Is the EU/Turkey deal compatible with the prohibition on refoulement and 
right to seek asylum? 
1.2 Limitations  
With the current refugee crisis in mind, this graduate thesis examines the legality of 
readmitting asylum seekers to Turkey today.  
Readmission is a network composed of different institutional instruments, 
ranging from development aid to visa facilitation, from technical cooperation for the 
                                                
9 See chapter 4.2. 
 13 
externalisation of migration controls to labour exchanges.10  
Since transfer of responsibility for asylum seekers to another safe country does 
not find a legal basis in general international law, the EU - to obtain the necessary 
cooperation for readmitting third-country nationals - commonly relies upon 
readmission agreements.  
I specifically chose to deal with the EU/Turkey deal on March 18, and not to 
expand, due to the limited space, to other comparable agreements. It is, at the time of 
writing, debatable whether or not this deal is a source of binding obligations – a 
treaty - under international law11 or merely a statement. 12 Important to recall is 
however that readmission agreements do not provide the legal basis for rejecting 
asylum seekers, but only facilitate the execution of an expulsion decision, which 
should always be taken in consonance with international and European human rights 
and refugee obligations.13 A readmission agreement per se cant therefore violate 
international human rights law or refugee law, it is a purely administrative tool 
following a decision of national law authorizing the return of a protection seeker on 
i.e. safe third country grounds. 14 This means, whether or not the EU/Turkey deal is 
formally a source of binding obligations – it will always be the following state 
conduct that potentially violates international human rights law or refugee law. 
This thesis is further limited to a study of the EU/Turkey deal’s compatibility 
with the right to seek asylum and non-refoulement. The broader right to asylum is a 
multifaceted concept, which makes it important to understand its scope and the legal 
structure because different ‘rights’ lie within. My study will cover asylum and 
protection seeker’s rights to seek asylum and access effective protection procedures, 
focusing on the right to apply protection and to have the substance of the request 
examined.  
Focus will be on the major legal issues that may call into question the legality 
of readmitting asylum seekers to Turkey. 
The study is primarily focusing on non-Turkish protection seekers who have 
transited through Turkey before soliciting protection within the borders of a EU 
Member State (this state will very likely be Greece due to its geographical 
proximity), and a substantive examination of the claim is therefore denied because 
the person could have applied for protection in Turkey and will thus be returned 
                                                
10 Giuffre, Readmission Agreements and Refugee Rights: from a Critique to a Proposal, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 32(3), (1 Sep 2013), p.82. 
11 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2(1)(a). 
12 See the discussion in chapter 3.4. 
13 Coleman (2009), p. 286  
14 ibid. p. 314. 
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there.  
The thesis is further delimited to a study of the “safe third country” notion, 
thereby consciously omitted related principles such as “safe country of origin” or 
“safe first country”. As a practice among European states, it generally implies that a 
substantive examination of a protection request can be denied if individuals have 
transited through a safe third country before reaching the State in which they are 
ultimately soliciting protection - the rationale being that moving to a secondary state 
is not for protection seeking but rather for migration.15  
The relevant, and indeed also the most controversial, safe third country 
exceptions are those, which exclude protection seekers from substantive asylum 
procedures, and proceed with expulsion without prior status determination, which is 
the focus of this thesis.16 A more thoroughly examination of the safe third country 
concept will be made in chapter 2.4.2.3.1.  
Evident from this is the importance of both the substantial and procedural 
aspect of protection in the sending state, including the evaluation of access to 
effective protection in the receiving state. However, it would be beyond the scope of 
this thesis to review the entire spectrum of conditions that must be in place for a 
sending state contemplating protection elsewhere, this thesis is therefore - as already 
indicated -limited to the issues concerning non-refoulement and the right to seek 
asylum. 
Although relevant, this study has consciously omitted the legal and the de 
facto situation in Greece in relation to the EU/Turkey deal. Instead, my focus it 
turned to a thorough examination and analyse of the relevant aspects of the situation 
in Turkey. However, I have left out a study of reception conditions for asylum 
seekers in Turkey for someone else to examine.  
1.3 Methods and sources  
This thesis is a legal study aimed at finding the international meaning of the 
prohibition on refoulement and right to seek asylum for thereafter make a 
comparative analysis whether the EU/Turkey deal suggest anything that falls short of 
those standards.  
This builds upon a theory, contoured by two partly conflicting policy frames: 
the realist frame of internal security, which emphasizes the need to tighten up 
                                                
15 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, (2007), p. 392.  
16 Coleman (2009) p. 226. 
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territorial borders and to fight illegal immigration, and the liberal frame of 
humanitarianism, which incorporates the human rights-based notions of the rights of 
individuals to receive protection and to have access to equitable asylum procedures.17 
While the desire for a common European asylum system appears to be based 
on justice, fairness and solidarity,18 criticism has been levelled at burden-sharing 
measures on the EU level for prioritizing the aim of securing borders. In light of the 
development of the EU/Turkey deal, this criticism might be legitimate, and I 
therefore choose to deal with this subject - as a mean to explore this potential gap. As 
Lavenex states, in liberal democracies, immigration regimes always pursue a middle 
way between these two normative extremes;19 however, do the EU/Turkey deal put 
too much emphasis on control and thereby falls short of complying with international 
human rights and refugee rights?  
With these considerations in mind, the research methodology and material in 
this study was basically conducted through a review of the EU/Turkey deal in the 
light of the non-refoulement principle and right to seek asylum. It is mainly based on 
international sources.  
The research also included a review of relevant literature, the examination of 
relevant international and regional instruments, as well as views of international 
monitoring or supervisory bodies and human rights organizations reports. The 
international and regional conventions as well as EU law concerning refugee rights 
will be considered as rule of law. Important to keep in mind as reader as well as a 
writer, is that while legal scholars certainly offer legitimate and much needed 
commentary on how the international human rights and refugee law should be 
interpreted, asylum law is a controversial area of law that evokes a lot of emotion. 
The legality of return arrangements is not the main feature of all commentary. It is 
can be confused with it should when conclusions are deduced more from wishful 
thinking than actual interpretation of the law. 
In order to further fulfil the aim of this thesis it has been necessary to study the 
de facto situation (national law and practices) for asylum seekers in Turkey and to 
interpret and apply relevant law in a readmission context.   
In my research, I have consciously omitted a comparative analysis of the 
national legislation and procedures of EU member states (read Greece). I 
                                                
17 Lavenex, Migration and the EU’s new eastern border: between realism and liberalism, 
(February 2001), p.26 
18 Precidency Conclusions – Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, SN 200/99, 
para 4. 
19 Lavenex, Migration and the EU’s new eastern border: between realism and liberalism, 
(February 2001), p.26 
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acknowledge the limitations my thesis thus entails and recognize that as a result of 
excluding this from my study the conclusions will not result in a definite 
interpretation of whether the EU/Turkey deal is in conformity with investigated 
provisions.  
Furthermore, the exact content and scope of international and human rights 
standards are delineated by the practice of international human rights bodies, 
competent to provide authoritative interpretations of the treaties. Relevant for this 
thesis, the practice and jurisprudence of two main, international monitoring bodies 
will be taken into account repeatedly. First, the UNHCR primary in relation to the 
Refugee Convention. Its power is however limited since states only undertake to 
cooperate with it.20 Nevertheless, even though much depends upon the goodwill of 
states, the interpretations by UNHCR in recommendations, conclusions, the 
handbook etc. provides authoritative guidance. The reporting system under the 
Refugee Convention itself is a rather weak one and does not provide for the 
possibility of inter-state or individual complaints. Secondly, the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR is of outmost importance. It provides authoritative judgements and guidance 
in a judicial procedure, which is obligatory to the relevant parties in the case 
concerned – beyond this most scholars regard the core content of its jurisprudence of 
the ECHR binding upon all states parties.21 This is important because the ECHR and 
its articles are phrased in very general terms and the content of them can only be well 
understood by studying the ECtHR’s case law. The ECtHR has dealt with 
readmission cases on several occasions, and I will repeatedly refer to this case law.  
In addition, relevant EU law will be covered and analyzed in the light of non-
refoulement and right to seek asylum. As it is upon the “safe third country” principle 
– enshrined in EU legislation - the EU/Turkey deal finds its legal basis, this will be in 
the center of attention while scrutinizing EU law. 
 
1.4 Disposition  
To be able to fulfil this thesis’ subject and aim, Chapter 2 contains a theoretical 
examination of the non-refoulement principle and the right to seek asylum, purposed 
to give a background of the rule of law.  Focus is on both international and European 
law. The first part is primary concerned about the substantive element of non-
                                                
20 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 35(1)  
21 See, e.g. Battjes (2006), p. 23; ECHR Article 32. 
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refoulement, and the second part with the procedural rights connected to the right to 
seek asylum.  
The EU/Turkey deal will be covered in Chapter 3. I will explain it thoroughly 
in order to scrutinize it in the light of relevant law in Chapter 5. The primary 
attention will be given to the parts most relevant for the right to seek asylum and 
non-refoulement.   
Chapter 4 continues with a critical study of the de facto and de jure situation in 
Turkey relevant for returned protection seekers. The chapter covers issues that may 
give rise to a real risk of deprivation of designated rights when asylum seekers are 
returned to Turkey.  
To connect above-mentioned facts, I will attempt to analyse the compatibility 
of the EU/Turkey deal in the light of the right to seek asylum and non-refoulement, 
as well as the Turkey country-facts in Chapter 5.  
I conclude this graduate thesis in Chapter 6 by providing an answer to my 
research questions.  
 
 18 
2 Theoretical examination of the 
legal framework   
To be able to fulfil the purpose of this thesis, this chapter will identify a series of 
obligations of international human rights and refugee law, constituting the legal 
framework regarding return of protection seekers from EU member states to third 
countries. The following will examine the scope and content of the non-refoulement 
principle and the right to seek asylum, whereby this chapter is delimited to 
designated rights. Chapter 2.1 deals primary with the substantive aspect of non-
refoulement in international human rights and refugee law, while Chapter 2.2 
primary focuses on relevant procedural aspects in the light of seek asylum.    
The universal rights of refugees can be found in two primary sources, the 
Refugee Convention and general standards of human rights law,22 and the chapter is 
duly divided between these. Relevant EU law is covered in the final subchapters.  
The conclusions drawn from this chapter will subsequently be compared with 
the EU/Turkey deal, whereby I will consider if this conduct raises questions under 
international human rights and refugee law. 
 
2.1 Non-Refoulement  
The universal principle of non-refoulement is of outmost importance for all asylum-
seekers, and unquestionably the centrepiece of international refugee law. It stipulates 
in broad terms the prohibition of expulsion of a person to a country where he/she 
would be exposed to a specifically defined risk and the term can be derived from the 
French word ‘refouler’, which means to repel or drive back. 23  International 
obligations relevant to the expulsion of protection seekers to third countries generally 
follow from explicit or implicit prohibitions of refoulement.24 The principle of non-
refoulement is solidly grounded in international human rights and refugee law, in 
treaty, in doctrine, and in customary international law. It is an inherent aspect of the 
absolute prohibition of torture, even sharing perhaps in some of the latter’s jus 
                                                
22 Hathaway (2005), p. 154.  
23 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007), p. 201. 
24 Coleman (2009) p.231. 
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cogens character.25  As will be covered further on, this principle limits States’ 
sovereign right to control entry to its territory, as well as return of protection seekers 
to other States. It has also consequences for States’ obligations to provide access to at 
least a part of its domestic asylum procedure for those who are reaching its territory 
in search for refuge. 26  
There is great support that the non-refoulement principle is viewed upon as 
international customary law and is incorporated in numerous legal instruments 
regarding refugees and asylum seekers.27 However, in a refugee context the content 
of the customary principle of non-refoulement corresponds largely to Article 33 of 
the Refugee Convention. 28  This article will be covered in detail in chapter 2.1.1 
below. Since all EU countries are parties to this Convention and thereby bound by 
the principle by treaty obligation, the customary character or meaning matters little 
why it will not be further discussed here.       
It is important to emphasize that the non-refoulement principle does not 
stipulate that an individual can claim a right to asylum. Nevertheless, states have a 
duty under international law not to hinder a person’s right to seek asylum.29 The 
principle of non-refoulement - the centrepiece of international refugee law - still 
stands as the strongest commitment of the international community of states to those 
who cannot turn to their own government for protection.30 
 
2.1.1 Non-refoulement under Refugee 
Convention 
The core among the bundle of refugee rights in the Refugee Convention is certainly 
the non-refoulement principle enshrined in Article 33(1). The apparent purpose of the 
Convention is to provide protection to refugees. It lacks however an enforcement 
mechanism, nevertheless the UNHCR works as an overseeing organ to provide 
                                                
25 Goodwin-Gill, The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of non-
refoulement, (2011), p. 444. 
26 Held by Vedsted-Hansen, Non-admission policies and the right to protection: refugees’ 
choice versus states exclusion, in J. Hathaway (red), Human rights and refugee law Vol. 2, 
(2013), p. 384 and 388.  
27 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) p. 354.  
28 See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, The scope and content of the principle of non refoulement, 
in: E. Feller, V. Turk, and F. Nicholson (red), Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, 2003 p. 87-181 (2003) p. 149 
para.217 ff. for a analyse (Continuing Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (2003))  
29 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) p357-358.  
30 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to asylum: international refugee law and the globalisation of 
migration control (2011), p. 44. 
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international protection to refugees and to assist governments in pursuing “permanent 
solutions for the problem of refugees”.31 
Article 33(1) provides: 
 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion” 
 
This provision is however not absolute as the following Article 33(2) provides 
exceptions to this rule, where there exist “reasonable grounds” for regarding a 
refugee as “a danger to the security of the country” or the refugee “having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country”.  
The subject of the protection afforded by the non-refoulement principle in 
Article 33(1) Refugee Convention is a “refugee”. Pursuant to Article 1(a)(2) of the 
Convention, as amended by Article I(2) of the 1967 Protocol, the term refugee 
applies to any person who: 
 
“Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it” 
 
The non-refoulement principle applies furthermore – in an initial state - to asylum 
seekers where there is a presumptive or prima facie claim to refugee status.32 For 
instance, UNHCR’s Executive Committee has argued, that it applies regardless if the 
individual has been formally recognized as a refugee – refugee hood is thus 
                                                
31 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General 
Assembly Resolution 428 (v) of 14 December 1950, at annex para 1.   
32 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) p 345-346.   
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declaratory rather than constitutive. 33 
 
2.1.1.1 Indirect refoulement  
UNHCR has frequently stated that Article 33 prohibits not only direct refoulement to 
the country of persecution, but also indirect chain refoulement. 34  UNHCR has 
consistently applied that principle specifically to the return of asylum seekers to third 
countries. In such cases, UNHCR has reiterated, that the third country must not be 
one that will refoule the person to a place where life or freedom would be threatened 
on any of the Convention grounds.35 This interpretation follows from the ordinary 
meaning of the phrase “in any manner whatsoever” in Article 33, and is confirmed 
by the travaux préparatoires.36 
 Article 33(1) cannot, however, be read as precluding removal to a ‘safe’ third 
country, i.e. one in which there is no danger of the kind just described. The 
prohibition on refoulement applies only in respect of territories where the refugee or 
asylum seeker would be at risk, not more generally. It does, however, require that a 
state proposing to remove a refugee or asylum seeker undertake a proper assessment 
as to whether the third country concerned is indeed safe, more about the procedural 
obligations in chapter 2.2.37 The country in which an asylum application is lodged is 
and remains ultimately responsible for assuring non-refoulement, even if that country 
transfers the person to a third country. 38 It cannot escape that duty by delegating it. 
While the third country remains primarily responsible for a direct act of 
refoulement, the first country, through its act of removal to the third country, is 
jointly liable for violating the prohibition on refoulement.39 This correspond to the 
“complicity principle” presented by Legomsky; “no country may send any person to 
another country, knowing that the latter will violate rights which the sending country 
                                                
33 See UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusions, No. 6 (XXVIII), Non-refoulement 
(1977), No. 79 (XLVII), General Conclusion on International Protection (1996), No. 81 
(XLVIII), General Conclusion on International Protection (1997), No. 82 (XLVIII), 
Safeguarding Asylum (1997).   
34 ECtHR, T.I v. United Kingdom No 43844/98 (7 March 2000) p. 14.; M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, No 30696/09 (21 January 2011) para. 286 and 342; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.Italy, 
No. 27765/09, (23 February 2012), para. 146-147 ; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Protocol (2007), p. 10.  
35 UNHCR Global Consultations, (31 May 2001), para. 50(c). 
36 Coleman (2009) p. 235; Hathaway (2005), pp. 322-323. 
37 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (2003) p. 122. 
38 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and criteria for determining refugee Status under 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, Geneva, January 1992, 
UNHCR 1979, Foreword II). (Continuing UNHCR Handbook) 
39 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007), pp. 252-253 
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is itself obligated to respect, regardless whether the third country is a party to the 
Refugee Convention or any other human rights conventions”.40 Legomsky gives 
numerous examples of when differences in interpretation might affect the ultimate 
outcome or otherwise disadvantage the applicant in ways that the destination country 
believes would violate the Convention, e.g. they might interpret the substantive 
definition of “refugee” differently.41 He argues that when the third country’s less 
favourable interpretation falls short of international standards such as non-
refoulement, return to the third country should be prohibited. However, when the 
refugee standards of the third country meet international standards, even though 
lower than the destination country, then the return of the applicant should be 
permitted even if doing so will ultimately lead to that person’s transfer to the country 
of origin. 42 
Gregor Noll further argues that there are two approaches that can be taken by 
states seized with the removal of a person.43 The first, the “formal approach,” would 
permit return as long as the third country is a party to the Refugee Convention and 
thus is formally bound to respect its dictates. On the other end of the spectrum he 
find the “empirical approach”. This entails inquiry into not only the relevant 
legislation in place but also the actual conditions and practices of the third country, 
mainly as suggested by the ECtHR resting on the interpretation of international law 
by lawfully established official international entities i.e. UNHCR.44 Because the 
country where the application is lodged bears the primary responsibility for the 
asylum claim it obligates it to follow international law and, arguably, to refrain from 
knowingly return the person to another country that will violate international law.  
 
2.1.2 Non-refoulement under Human Rights  
The Refugee Convention is the floor, but not the ceiling for the rights of refugees. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider those developments in human rights law that 
are applicable to refugees. Consequently, the protection from refoulement is 
additionally ensured under the human rights framework for a person who doesn’t 
qualify as a refugee, but nevertheless risk serious harm upon return. States are 
                                                
40 Legomsky (2003) p.5.   
41 See the discussion regarding the T.I v. United Kingdom No 43844/98 (7 March 2000) in 
2.1.2.3 and 2.2.2. 
42 Legomsky (2003) p.58. 
43 Noll, Formalism v. Empiricism: Some Reflections on the Dublin Convention on the 
Occasion of Recent European Case Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, (2001). 
44 Ibid. p. 2. 
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prohibited to send a person to a state with respect to whom there are substantial 
grounds to believe he/she face a real risk of being subject to ill-treatment. This is 
particularly true if that person would face a risk of arbitrary loss of life, torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment.45 The prohibition on refoulement can be deduced 
from Article 3 ECHR46, Article 7 ICCPR47 Prohibition of torture and Article 3 CAT 
prohibiting States to refouler someone to a place where they risk torture. Of 
relevance is also the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, enshrined in 
Protocol 4 Article 4 ECHR. Continuing, my focus will be on the prohibition of 
refoulement deduced from Article 3 ECHR and thus, the provisions enclosed in 
ICCPR and CAT will not be further regarded because of the wish to enter more 
deeply in ECHR. 
Article 3 states: 
 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or  
degrading treatment or punishment” 
 
Article 3 is an absolute provision, which means that there are no exceptions and no 
derogations allowed under any circumstances.48 This provision has significantly 
limited state’s freedom to remove individuals who may be at risk of ill treatment 
covered by the article in the territories to which return is contemplated.49  
The ECHR – an international treaty ratified by all Member States of the 
Council of Europe50 - has the purpose of providing minimum standards of protection 
for human rights. The ECHR applies within the territory of contracting states and 
impose obligations to respect a variety of mainly civil and political rights.  
I will continue this chapter by first establish that Article 3 includes an implicit 
prohibition of refoulement, followed by a discussion about inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Thereafter I determine that it also includes indirect 
refoulement.  
 
                                                
45 See ECHR Article 2 and 3; CAT Article 3; Concerning ECHR Article 3 see Soering v. 
United Kingdom No. 14038/88; Concerning Article 6 and 7 ICCPR see UN Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 20, para. 9.  
46 See Soering v. United Kingdom No. 14038/88 7 (July 1989), para. 90-91.   
47HRC, General Comment No. 20, para. 9. 
48 Articles 3 and 15 ECHR. 
49 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007) p. 366. 
50 Shaw (2014), pp. 250-251.  
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2.1.2.1 Article 3 ECHR – an implicit prohibition of refoulement  
Confirmation by the ECtHR that Article 3 indeed implies a refoulement prohibition 
followed by the Soering v. the United Kingdom. 51  It concluded that the non-
refoulement principle in Article 3 is applicable regardless of whether the ill-treatment 
concerned would take place in a Convention state or in another state.52 According to 
the ECtHR, an extradition, as it were in this particular case, engages the 
responsibility of the extraditing state under Article 3 “where substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of 
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.53 It 
thereby introduced the “real risk” criterion for assessing the likelihood of treatment 
contrary to Article 3 in the recipient state.  
In the Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden case54 a definition of the implicit 
prohibition of refoulement was formulated. It provided that: a protection seeker may 
not be removed to a country where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.55 
 
2.1.2.2 Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
For the non-refoulement protection to apply, the person has to fear future ill-
treatment that is severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3 and show 
substantial grounds that he/she faces a real risk of being subjected to such treatment. 
Both general and personal circumstances are relevant for the risk assessment.56  
The substantive reach of the prohibition of refoulement, implicit as we saw in 
Article 3 ECHR, is however difficult to determine. One reason for this is the 
Article’s broad terms, no definition of the forms of proscribed ill-treatment is to be 
found in the text of the ECHR. It is therefore important to look at the extensive case 
law of the Court in this regard.57 
Exactly when a certain treatment or punishment would cross the minimum 
threshold for being, at the very least, “degrading” cannot be established generally. It 
                                                
51 Soering v. United Kingdom No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989). 
52 ibid. para. 91 
53 ibid. 
54 Cruz Varas v. Sweden No.15576/89, (20 March 1991) 
55 ibid. paras. 69-70. 
56 Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, (28 June 2011), para. 
216.   
57 Coleman, (2009), p.261. 
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depends on the specific circumstances of the case.58 The important issue is whether 
the level of ill-treatment can affect the application of Article 3. The article contains 
as mentioned three concepts; degrading treatment, inhuman treatment and torture. 
Non-refoulement is applicable to all the levels of ill-treatment prohibited under 
Article 3. In refoulement cases the requirement that the possible treatment must attain 
a minimum level of severity is often repeated. Again it depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the case, making it difficult to say, in general, what treatment falls 
within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. 
I will in the continuing give some examples of degrading treatment, since this 
is the least severe concept and is therefore included in the inhuman treatment or 
torture. The ECtHR has defined degrading treatment as treatment that “humiliates or 
debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her 
human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking 
an individual's moral and physical resistance”.59 As already noticed, the level of 
severity depends on all the specific circumstances of the case, such as the duration of 
the treatment, its effects and in some cases the sex, age and state of health of the 
victim.60  
Certain is that a “real risk” of exposure to any of the forms of maltreatment 
covered by Article 3 ECHR in another country would be sufficient to prohibit 
return.61 
2.1.2.3 Indirect Refoulement  
In T.I. v. the United Kingdom62 the Court confirmed that the obligation on non-
refoulement persists when a state party deports a person to an intermediate country in 
which the person does not face a direct threat of ill treatment. T.I. was a Sri Lankan 
national who challenged his transfer under the Dublin Convention from the United 
Kingdom to Germany. The court ruled that a deporting state has to take into account 
the risk that an intermediate country will in turn deport the person to a country in 
which the person faces a direct threat of ill-treatment.63After establishing that T.I 
faced an arguable risk of ill-treatment in his country of origin, the Court focused, in 
the assessment of indirect refoulement, on the risk of arbitrary return. The Court 
ruled that a deportation will expose an asylum seeker to a risk of indirect refoulement 
                                                
58 McAdam (2007): Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law. Published to 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012, p. 141. 
59 Pretty v. United Kingdom, No. 2346/02 (27 July 2002), para 71. 
60 See e.g. Hilal v. The United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, para. 60.   
61 Soering v. United Kingdom No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989), para. 88.  
62 T.I v. United Kingdom No 43844/98 (7 March 2000). 
63  Ibid. p. 15,18.   
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and ill-treatment if the intermediate country’s asylum procedure does not provide 
sufficient guarantees that people who fear ill-treatment receive protection and the 
intermediate country carries out deportations.64 The Court concluded that procedural 
safeguards existed in Germany, but questioned their effectiveness for the applicant 
because of Germany’s interpretation and application of them. This implies that a 
state, intent on expulsion to a third country, must consider whether the protection 
seeker would face a real risk of onward removal to another country in breach of 
Article 3 ECHR.65 We will discuss this duty to investigate in light of the right to 
asylum in chapter 2.2.2.  
In sum, a situation of indirect refoulement involves two elements of risk. First, 
there is of course the existence of a real risk that the person will be subjected to 
proscribed ill-treatment in the final country of destination (in the T.I case: the country 
of origin). Secondly, there is the additional risk that the person concerned will be sent 
to the country of final destination by the intermediary country. Indirect refoulement 
therefore implies an assessment of the risks awaiting an applicant. The main 
objective being to assess whether, taking into consideration the personal 
circumstances of the applicant, he/she faces a real risk of ill treatment in the country 
concerned exists.66 
2.2 Right to seek asylum 
After going through the relevant substantive aspects connected to the non-
refoulement principle, we will now turn to the right to seek asylum.67  
The right to seek asylum is essentially a right of an individual to leave his 
country of residence in pursuit of asylum. The basis for this right is the principle that 
“a State may not claim to 'own' its nationals or residents.”68 The right to leave is 
enshrined in several international and regional instruments. Article 13(2) of the 
UDHR69 proclaims that, "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own." It is moreover protected in Article 2(2) Protocol 4 ECHR and Article 12 
ICCPR. However, as been noted by Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer, while the right 
                                                
64 Ibid. p. 14-18.   
65 Ibid. p.17. 
66 Mink (2012) p.136. 
67 Right to seek asylum encapsulates in this thesis the right to apply for asylum and to have 
the application examined  – as explained under Limitations.  
68 Boed (1994) p. 6. 
69Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 (10 December 
1948).   
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to seek asylum in certain conditions imposes duties on states to prevent and refrain 
from refoulement (if people have the right to leave and seek protection from torture, 
so, too, do states have a correlative duty to refrain from subjecting people to regimes 
where their lives and liberty may be endangered, or where they may be subjected to 
torture), this right does not impose these duties on any specific state.70 They continue 
by explaining that the right to seek asylum is a right that requires the cooperation of a 
potential state of asylum. However, it is not subject to the right of states arbitrarily to 
refuse to allow the possibility to seek asylum. The reason being that “the recognition 
of the right to refuge and asylum presupposes that state sovereignty and self-
determination have to yield in cases of “well-founded fear of being persecuted” or, in 
another language, that the basic right or need to security is strong enough to 
outweigh other rights and competing ethicopolitical, prudential, and realist 
arguments”. 71 
UDHR was the first instrument that gave the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
universal recognition. Article 14 provides: 
 
“Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution”. 
 
The formulation was controversial, reflecting state’s unease to include a right to be 
granted asylum since it create a subjective right to enter its territory.72  
The UDHR is not a legally enforceable instrument in itself and solely provides 
universal goals for the state parties. Many scholars argue however that it has become 
binding either through custom, general principles of law or by subsequent practice.73 
Nevertheless, neither state practice nor corresponding opino juris regarding the 
UDHR supports a right to access state territory in order to seek asylum as well as it 
does not support a duty on the states to grant asylum to those seeking it.74 The 
difficulty with this apparently sacrosanct guarantee is that it is not clear who is 
                                                
70 Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer, On the morality and legality of borders: border policies 
and asylum seekers, 2013, p.5-6. (Continuing Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer (2013)). 
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obliged to provide asylum.75 Lautherpacht was highly critical and argued that it 
simply restated State’s existing rights under international law to grant refuge.76  
Costello argues that, without accessible and fair asylum determination 
procedures, the international system of refugee protection is undermined. Fairness 
requires procedures that ensure outcomes that are accurate, efficient and acceptable77  
The relationship between right to seek asylum and the non-refoulement 
principle is highly intertwined – evident from Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer’s 
argument above. As judge Pinto De Albuquerque further argues in his conquering 
opinion in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy78; “the non-refoulement obligation has two 
procedural consequences: the duty to advise an alien of his or her rights to obtain 
international protection and the duty to provide for an individual, fair and effective 
refugee status determination and assessment procedure, with an evaluation of the 
personal risk of harm”. 
These procedural guarantees apply to all asylum seekers regardless of their 
legal and factual status. If refugee status is accepted to be declaratory rather than 
constitutive, as is generally acknowledged, 79  then preventing a refugee from 
accessing the status determination procedures within a state can be the equivalent of 
refoulement. Aside that fact, as Legomsky points out - whether or not the UDHR or 
any other sources create a right to apply for asylum somewhere, no international 
instrument establishes an absolute right to receive a decision on the substance of an 
asylum claim by the country of one’s choosing. To put the point another way, no rule 
of international law establishes a per se prohibition on diverting asylum applicants to 
third countries.80  
However, contemplating protection to an intermediate country can be 
problematic for two reasons as chapter 2.1 explained. Firstly, the protection seeker 
may face a risk of persecution or ill-treatment in the intermediate country itself. In 
other words, it may be that the return to the intermediate country constitutes direct 
refoulement. Secondly, potential asylum seekers may also be treated good in the 
intermediate country but claim that it may return them to their country of origin, 
where they do face persecution or ill-treatment. In that case, return to the third 
                                                
75 Costello, The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Profileration of Safe Country 
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78 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.Italy, No. 27765/09, (23 February 2012). 
79 UNHCR Handbook, par. 28.   
80 Legomsky (2003), p. 39. 
 29 
country may constitute indirect refoulement. From this stem additional questions; can 
states when contemplating protection elsewhere, properly assess the safety of a third 
state without addressing the particular circumstances of the request? Or should the 
sending state assess in each individual case if the intermediate country is safe for that 
particular individual? Evident from this, and important to keep in mind, is to 
distinguish between the substantial examination of the risk of persecution or serious 
harm in the country of origin, and assessment of the risk that the intermediate state 
will expel the protection seeker in breach of the prohibitions of refoulement.    
 
2.2.1 Right to seek asylum under the Refugee 
Convention  
I will in this subchapter first outline the general requirements for the examination of 
claims to protection that stems from the Refugee Convention in the country where an 
application for protection is lodged. Thereafter, relevant aspects when returning to a 
third country will be reviewed.   
2.2.1.1 General requirements for the examination of protection 
claims 
To begin with, no matter how intertwined, it is important to separate the right to seek 
asylum from non-refoulement. The non-refoulement obligation in Article 33 does not 
provide a “right to asylum” and a state may return refugees as long as the principle is 
not violated. This is in line with states’ sovereignty to regulate the entry of non-
citizens into their territory. Thus, states have no obligation to admit refugees or any 
other alien.81Article 33 of the Refugee Convention is only concerned with where an 
individual cannot be sent back to, and not from where the individual is trying to 
escape.82  
Neither Article 33 nor any of the other provisions of the Refugee Convention 
contains an explicit right to seek or enjoy asylum. 83 Similarly, the Refugee 
Convention neither stipulates that states must determine the status of persons 
claiming international protection, nor does it specify any procedures to this end. 
Whether the Refugee Convention, nevertheless, would oblige State parties implicitly 
to substantively assess a protection request within their jurisdiction is still a 
                                                
81 Goodwin-Gill, & McAdam (2007) p. 206-207.   
82 Hathaway (2005), p. 308-310. 
83 Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention only obliges State parties “as far as possible 
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somewhat contested issue in the literature.84 The personal scope of Article 33(1) 
includes persons recognized as refugees as concluded in chapter 2.1.1. We also recall 
that in an initial state however, the principle also applies to asylum seekers, as if a 
refugee, where there is a presumptive or prima facie claim to refugee status.85 The 
fact that protection seekers fall within the ambit of Article 33(1) Refugee Convention 
and that refugee status is declaratory rather than constitutive, as is generally 
acknowledged,86 has invited commentators to deduce an obligation upon States to 
make a substantive examination of an application for asylum. The most common 
argument is that a State could not be sure that it is not committing refoulement by 
sending a protection seeker back, until determination of his or her status would 
discredit the protection claim, implying a duty to determine the status of protection 
seekers.87  
However, according to the travaux préparatoires to the Refugee Convention, 
not only the right to asylum was intentionally omitted, but also a duty to undertake 
status determination.88 It may have been that the states wished not to come too close 
to the, not wanted, duty to grant asylum. Thus, undertaking status determination is 
not an obligation under the Refugee Convention. Consequently, the Refugee 
Convention cannot be considered to contain an obligation for States to implement 
refugee determination procedures. Status determination under the Refugee 
Convention is a discretionary choice, although it is many times a practical necessity 
if a State wishes to avoid breaching the prohibition against refoulement.89In other 
words, claiming refugee-hood in a country does not imply that such a claim must be 
decided or even examined on its merits there under the Refugee Convention. 
2.2.1.2 Returning to a third country  
The relevance of the findings in previous chapter for returning protection seekers to 
third states is, according to Coleman, that this may take place without prior 
substantive examination of the protection claim. Further, whether the third country 
will undertake status determination does not determine the legality of expulsion to 
that country. Thirdly, considering that the Refugee Convention allows a destination 
state to return a protection seeker to a third country, the possibility of onward 
expulsion to another third country – a “fourth” country – does not prima facie 
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85 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007), p. 345-346.   
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determine the legality of expulsion, either. The non-refoulement principle require, as 
my examination showed, that a proper examination must be made however as to the 
third state is safe. Coleman concludes that as long as States respect the prohibition of 
direct and indirect refoulement, the Refugee Convention does not prevent the 
continuous expulsion of a protection seeker from one country to another. This means 
that protection seekers may be subjected to a chain of expulsions, treated as if a 
refugee for the purposes of Article 33(1) Refugee Convention by every state, but 
without consideration of the merits of the protection claim anywhere.90  
UNHCR has repeatedly insisted to this subject that no asylum seeker be 
returned to a third country, under a safe third country provision or a readmission 
agreement, unless the third country will provide a fair refugee status determination or 
provide effective protection without such a determination.91 Legomsky argues in a 
similar fashion, that the central (albeit not the only) rationale for fair procedure, is 
that an unfair procedure necessarily produces an unjustifiably high risk of violating 
the individual’s substantive rights e.g. be erroneously refouled. Thus, a fair refugee 
status determination is one essential component of the Article 33 prohibition on 
refoulement, and consequently, an unfair refugee status determination procedure 
could - in itself - violate Article 33.92 Legomsky further states that it is the actual 
protection, not the formalities that should control. Thus, the third state can afford 
effective protection from refoulement in several ways.  If the third country will 
honour all the elements of effective protection without the formality of a refugee 
status determination, then the requirements of the present subsection should be 
deemed satisfied.93 Taken this in consideration, one can argue that assessment of a 
refugee claim by the third state is not required as long as there is some sort of 
permission to stay in the in the third state. As it is this result that counts, it does not 
matter on what grounds the permission is granted.  
If the non-refoulement principle implicitly requires a fair asylum procedure (or 
effective protection without) Left to decide is thus what it takes to make a refugee 
status determination efficient/fair? The state in which an application is lodged has the 
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his/hers claim to the authorities and have it examined substantively. 
 32 
immediate and primary responsibility to protect the refugee against refoulement. 
Such responsibility includes an assessment of the safety of the third country, if 
applicable.94  The condition of safety of the third country concerns not just the sole 
risk of being returned to the frontiers of territories where there is a threat to his life or 
freedom in accordance with Article 33(1) Refugee Convention, but also the 
availability of further effective protection in the third country. This thesis will not 
provide a detailed discussion of all probable requirements of a fair refugee status 
determination here due to the limited space. Nevertheless, relevant criteria for the 
aim thesis includes the absence of a direct threat to an applicants’ life or freedom. If 
not, the removal would be a direct violation of the prohibition of refoulement.95 
Secondly, the refugee must have a clear and real ability lawfully to enter and remain 
in the third country, and as such the third country must expressly agree to admit the 
refugee to its territory.96 UNHCR has stated that a fair asylum procedures includes; 
access to UNHCR, protection of privacy and keeping information confidential, able 
to testify freely, guarantee that his or her asylum application and specific testimony 
will not be shared with the country of origin and protection of refugees with special 
vulnerabilities. 97 Essential is that the examinations of designated criteria must at all 
times be performed on an individual basis. 98 
 
2.2.2 Protection against refoulement under 
Article 3 ECHR 
This chapter considers whether the ECHR contains a right to seek protection and 
whether member states are obliged to examine the substance of a protection request. 
To clarify, neither Article 3 nor any other provision in the ECHR provides a right to 
asylum. This has been clearly recognized in the ECtHR’s case law - in general it 
initially considers that States parties have a right to control the entry, residence and 
expulsion of aliens.99 Nevertheless, it has marked out the boundaries beyond which 
return might infringe Article 3 – and that is what I will examine. 100 
                                                
94 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem (2003), p. 122, para. 116. 
95 EXCOM Conclusion No. 58 (XL) 1989, para. (f) (i); See also chapter 2.1 regarding the 
prohibition on being returned to the frontiers of territories where there is a threat. 
96 Legomsky (2003), p. 54. 
97 UNHCR Global Consultations on International Protection/Third Track: Asylum Processes 
(Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), (31 May 2001), para. 50; Legomsky (2003) p. 75 
98 See for a comprehensive analysis of the elements of effective protection Legomsky (2003), 
pp.52-79f. See also Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007), pp. 393-395. 
99 See e.g. ECtHR Jabari v Turkey, No. 40035/98, (11 July 2000, ) para. 38. 
100 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007), p. 366ff. 
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As in chapter 2.1.2, I will solely cover ECHR amongst international human 
rights instruments for similar reasons as stated there. First, I will analyse general 
requirements for the right to protection and examination of claims to protection 
against return under Article 3 ECHR in the country where an application is lodged. 
Thereafter, relevant aspects of status determination when returning to a third country 
will be reviewed.   
 
2.2.2.1 General requirements for the examination of protection 
claims 
So, the ECHR does not contain the concept of asylum as the UDHR – despite its 
clear influences from it. In spite of this, Article 3 ECHR contains an implicit absolute 
prohibition on refoulement as established in chapter 2.1.2.1. States are thereby 
obliged to protect everyone in the state jurisdiction from the real risk of ill-treatment. 
The nature of the State’s responsibility under Article 3 in refoulement cases lies in 
exposing an individual to the risk of proscribed ill-treatment and not in subjecting the 
individual to proscribed ill-treatment itself.101 
The ECtHR has further concluded that Article 3 also implies procedural 
obligations upon member states and a requirement of rigorous examination to legal 
remedies when examining a protection claim linked to a risk of treatment contrary to 
Article 3, as well as to decisions not to consider such claim. 102 
When examining the procedural limb of Article 3, it is important to include 
Article 13 in this review. If a claim is submitted and declared inadmissible according 
to the state, the individual concerned must be able to challenge any subsequent 
decision to remove him/her, in accordance with both Articles 3 and 13 of the 
Convention. Article 13 provides: 
 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” 
 
The ECtHR has identified many deficiencies in asylum procedures and deportation 
decisions both in the context of Article 3 and in the context of Article 3 and Article 
                                                
101 See e.g. ECtHR, Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden, No. 15576/89, (20 March 1991) para. 
76; ECtHR. 
102 Coleman (2009) p.272. 
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13 combined. Deficiencies in this procedural guarantee may render the protection for 
asylum seekers against refoulement ineffective.  
According to ECtHR’s constant case law, an effective remedy is one that is 
“available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged”,103 and 
allows the competent authority “both to deal with the substance of the relevant 
Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief”.104  
In the very important case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece105, that revolves 
around both direct refoulement if return protection seekers to Greece, and the risk of 
the applicant being returned to Afghanistan from Greece without a serious 
examination of the merits of his asylum claim and without access to an effective 
remedy, the ECtHR found violations by Greece, the intermediate state, and Belgium, 
the sending state, in respect of the applicant’s right to an effective remedy under 
Article 13 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3. The Court concluded 
that due to Greece’s failure to apply the asylum legislation and the major structural 
deficiencies for access to the asylum procedure and remedies, there were no effective 
guarantees protecting the applicant from onward arbitrary removal to Afghanistan, 
where he risked ill treatment. Regarding Belgium, the procedure for challenging a 
transfer to Greece did not meet the ECtHR case law requirements of close and 
rigorous scrutiny of a complaint in cases where expulsion to another country might 
expose an individual to treatment prohibited by Article 3.106 
Another relevant case is Jabari v. Turkey.107 The Court found there that the 
applicant had been denied an effective remedy, after her application for protection 
had been rejected without substantive consideration because a failure to request 
asylum five days after her entry. The Court stated that: “given the irreversible nature 
of the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or ill-treatment alleged materialised 
and the importance which attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective remedy 
under Article 13 requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there 
exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 
(…)”.108 In other words, an effective remedy under Article 13, against an Article 3 
complaint in an expulsion case, requires rigorous, as well as independent scrutiny. 
Coleman argues that rigorous scrutiny implies consideration of the merits of the 
complaint, i.e. the alleged risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
                                                
103 Coleman (2009) p.272. 
104 Soering v. United Kingdom No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989), para. 120.  
105 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, No 30696/09 (21 January 2011). 
106 Ibid. paras. 385-397. 
107 Jabari v Turkey, No. 40035/98, (11 July 2000). 
108 Ibid. para. 50 Coleman (2009) p.273. 
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punishment.109 It follows from this judgement that Article 3 ECHR requires that the 
expelling state make “a meaningful assessment” of the claim that the expulsion will 
lead to ill-treatment. 110 
It seems as, because of the special character of the absolute provision in Article 
3, the ECtHR tends to insist on substantive examination of an Article 3 claim before 
removal to that country producing the risk - failing to undertake a substantive 
examination would under certain circumstances be “at variance with the protection of 
the fundamental value embodied in Article 3”.111  As Coleman puts it - this clearly 
places limits on procedural obstacles under national law, which would prevent such 
an examination from taking place. 
2.2.2.2 Returning to a third country 
I will now turn to the issue whether or not a state is obliged under Article 3 ECHR to 
examine a protection request on its substance before removal to an intermediate 
country – in other words not to the country where he/she actually fears a risk of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as examined in previous 
chapter. Just to clarify, if an individual is returned to an intermediate country where 
he/she faces persecution, torture, or inhuman treatment, his/her return to that 
intermediate country constitutes a violation of the same provisions of international 
law on which asylum law is based on in general, examined in previous subchapter. 
The following explores if it is possible for a State under the ECHR to avoid the 
duty of a rigorous and independent examination by returning the person to an 
intermediate country. Furthermore, it will also consider whether a substantive 
examination in the third country is a requirement to determine that country “safe”.  
 
2.2.2.2.1 Substantive examination of protection request 
before return 
The principles enshrined in the T.I. v. the United Kingdom112 case, as examined 
earlier in chapter 2.1.2.3, is also relevant when returning a protection seeker to 
countries outside the Dublin area. As we remember, this case enshrined the important 
ruling that a sending state is still responsible for the protection seeker under Article 3 
even though returning to a third country.113 The ECtHR ruled in T.I that the United 
                                                
109 Coleman (2009) p. 273. 
110 Jabari v Turkey, No. 40035/98, (11 July 2000), para 40.  
111 ibid. para. 40; N. Coleman (2009) p.236. 
112 T.I v. United Kingdom No 43844/98 (7 March 2000). 
113 Coleman (2009) p.275. 
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Kingdom could not leave out an individual examination under Article 3 by “rely(ing) 
automatically (…) on the arrangements made in the Dublin regulation.” 114  A 
problem identified by Coleman,115 central to both the Dublin Convention and safe 
third country policies, is that they are based on the underlying assumption of equal, 
or at least harmonized, protection standards between countries.  
In this context, the ECtHR in the T.I case, reiterated that an Article 3 claim 
requires a “rigorous scrutiny”, as we saw in the Jabari116 case in chapter 2.2.1.1.117 
This requirement rendered in T.I that when deciding whether or not the sending state 
– United Kingdom - had complied with its international obligations, the ECtHR 
proceeded with a marginal examination of the applicant’s situation in Sri Lanka –the 
country of origin - followed by a very elaborate and detailed examination of his 
situation in Germany – the intermediate country. The ECtHR ruled that the sending 
state must make sure that the intermediate country’s asylum procedure offers 
sufficient guarantees, which protects the applicant from being (directly/indirectly) 
removed without an examination of the risks to be exposed to treatment in contrary 
to Article 3.118  
The ECtHR explicitly mentioned the importance of a substantive examination 
in the sending state, when the application “give rise to concerns” as to the risks faced 
by the applicant. This illustrates the importance it attributes to a substantive 
examination. It is thus arguable that the ECtHR hereby imposed such a requirement, 
but it didn’t clearly indicate that as compulsory.119 As the “gives rise to concern” 
criterion is a more marginal concept than the “real risk” criterion it did not impose a 
full examination of the merits, but a status determination “lite” as Coleman puts it. 
The T.I. case would thus indicate that the state, partly, escape the duty to undertake 
status determination under Article 3 ECHR by expelling a protection seeker to a third 
country. In this case, the duty of rigorous examination would be replaced by a duty 
of marginal examination of the applicant’s situation in the country of origin.120  
Moreover, the Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy121 case, which concerns the interception of 
Eritrean and Somali migrants on the high seas and their subsequent return to Libya, 
contains important safeguards concerning returns to third countries.  ECtHR 
                                                
114 Emphasis added. T.I v. United Kingdom No 43844/98 (7 March 2000), p.15 
115 Coleman (2009) p. 275. 
116 Jabari v Turkey, No. 40035/98, (11 July 2000). 
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emphasized on the right of a protection seeker to gain effective access to asylum 
procedures and substantiate their complaints by putting forward their arguments 
against the measure taken by the relevant authority, a right essential for anyone 
subject to a removal measure, the consequences of which are potentially irreversible, 
according to the wording of the Court. 122  It further held that a purposive 
interpretation of Article 4 Protocol 4 of the ECHR (collective expulsion) reveals how 
the primary goal of the non-refoulement principle is to prevent states from removing 
aliens without examining their individual circumstances.123  The purpose of the 
provision is to guarantee the right to lodge a claim for asylum, which will be 
individually assessed, regardless of how the asylum seeker reached the country 
concerned. It should be kept in mind, as Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer states, that 
this assessment is not about the substance of the claim in any sense, but about 
whether the migrant wants to submit a claim. A person who is to be refused entry 
should be given the opportunity to claim asylum.124 Consequently, no limitations 
may be imposed to prevent access to the initial determination procedure. This 
includes denying access to the procedure because the person concerned can be 
returned to a safe third country. 
Following that line of reasoning, the Court found that the applicants had been 
carried back to Libya in the absence of identification and individual examination of 
protection claims, which amounted to a collective expulsion in breach of Article 4 of 
Protocol 4. Further, it found the Italian Government in breach of Article 13 in 
combination with Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol 4 since the 
applicants were deprived of any remedy, which would have enabled them to lodge 
their complaints with a competent authority and to obtain a thorough and rigorous 
assessment of their requests before the removal. Important is that the court observed 
that the general information on Eritrea and Somalia indicated that the situation there 
posed serious and widespread threats to security. On that fact alone, the applicants 
had an arguable claim that return would constitute refoulement.125 
 
 
 
                                                
122 ibid. para. 204.   
123 ibid. para. 177   
124 Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer (2013) p.13. 
125 paras. 149-152 
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2.2.2.2.2 Requirements upon the intermediate country 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I will examine whether the ECHR requires access 
to asylum procedures and a substantive examination by the third country as a 
requirement to determine that country “safe”.  
As we have seen, Article 3 ECHR prohibits the expulsion of a protection 
seeker to a country where he or she runs a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
an inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Also, Article 3 prohibits the 
indirect removal, through an intermediary country, of an alien to a country where 
he/she runs such a risk. 126  Transferring states must therefore assure that the 
intermediary country’s asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid his/ 
hers expulsion to a country where he/she runs a risk of being subjected to such 
treatment.  
The T.I v. United Kingdom case referred to above, furthermore addressed the 
question which safeguards the third state should offer. In this context the court ruled 
that: “the Court’s primary concern is whether there are effective procedural 
safeguards of any kind protecting the applicant from being removed from Germany 
to Sri Lanka.” The ECtHR’s final considerations in T.I made clear that “effective 
protection” can be afforded also by other means than procedural safeguards: “the 
Court finds that it is not established that there is a real risk that Germany would expel 
the applicant to Sri Lanka in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, 
the United Kingdom have not failed in their obligations under this provision by 
taking the decision to remove the applicant to Germany. Nor has it been shown that 
this decision was taken without appropriate regard to the existence of adequate 
safeguards in Germany to avoid the risk of any inhuman or degrading treatment”.127 
Thus, the sending state complies with its obligations under indirect refoulement if it 
has “appropriate regarded” that the third state provides for “adequate safeguards” of 
some kind.  
Under the ECHR, a removing state has a duty to verify the risk and assess the 
foreseeable consequences of a proposed removal, particularly when human rights 
reports on a country show that the removing state knew or ought to have known of 
the risks, see for example the considerations about the Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy case 
above.  
                                                
126 e.g. T.I v. United Kingdom No 43844/98 (7 March 2000).  
127 ibid. p.16 
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In the very important case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece as examined, 
where the ECtHR found that Belgian authorities were found responsible under 
Article 3 for a Dublin transfer to Greece, the ECtHR concluded that the Greek 
asylum procedure did not guarantee that the applicant’s request would be seriously 
examined due to a lack of access to an asylum procedure. 128 The ECtHR’s finding 
establishes that access to a process capable of delivering an effective remedy is a 
vital human right. Poor information, communication and infrastructure for accepting 
applications are examples of deficiencies that may hinder asylum seekers that fear ill-
treatment from effectively seeking protection.129 The Court rules that removal of an 
asylum seeker cannot take place if the removing country “knows or ought to (know) 
that (there is) no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined” 
in the third country.130 
The M.S.S case is important because the ECtHR specified, for the first time, 
the requirements corresponding to the demands of effectiveness under Article 13 
ECHR. It accepted that the scope of the obligations under Article 13 varies 
depending on the nature of the applicant's complaint, but it sets the requirement of 
effectiveness as a common threshold. The ECtHR insisted that there must exist 
procedures in a state to enable the protection seekers to ask and be granted the form 
of protection they are entitled to. First of all the ECtHR submitted that the remedies 
have to be available in the sense that their exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered 
by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the intermediate state.131 Further, it 
underlined the intermediate country’s obligation to facilitate the protection seekers’ 
access to a fair and effective international protection system and their communication 
with the competent authorities, their access to legal aid if and when necessary and the 
reception of the necessary information concerning the procedure.132 The ECtHR 
maintained that the procedure should be able to guarantee a proper review of an 
international protection request and/or deportation order with suspensive effect 
satisfying the needs of legal certainty and protection required in such matters.133 The 
systematic administrative deficiencies combined with the failure of Greek 
government to satisfy the minimum requirements as regards the asylum seekers 
reception conditions, amounted to a breach of Article 3. As one separate Concurring 
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Opinion noted, the Court focused entirely on the conditions in Greece, rather than on 
the specific risks posed if removed to Afghanistan.134  
The ECtHR’s holding in M.S.S, confirmed its decisions in the T.I. case 
discussed above. Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer identified 135  two emerging 
principles from the case:  
 
- “When a state removes an asylum seeker to a third state, the removing state 
must make sure that the third country’s asylum procedure affords sufficient 
guarantees to prevent an asylum seeker from being removed, directly or 
indirectly, to his country of origin without an evaluation of the risks he faces 
from the standpoint of Article 3 of the ECHR (i.e., the right not to be 
subjected to inhuman treatment, which includes non-refoulement)136 
- In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the third 
state complies with its obligations under international law.”137 
 
Consequently, an intermediate country is considered safe if there is some safeguard 
that protects a particular applicant from expulsion to his country of origin. But 
usually, there will be no such safeguards for the particular applicant. In such case, 
there may nevertheless be a safeguard in the form of access to examination 
procedures in the third country. If it is sufficiently sure that the third country will sort 
out whether the applicant is in need of protection, the third state is safe for the 
purposes of the prohibitions of refoulement.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified a series of international obligations, relevant to the return 
of protection seekers to third/intermediate countries. Under international law, states 
have a right to grant asylum and a duty not to prevent those who wish to emigrate or 
seek asylum elsewhere from doing so. International asylum law does not specifically 
regulate procedures for the granting of protection, but the obligation to give full 
effect to the prohibitions of refoulement has implications for such procedures for it 
does form a distinctive right for people to be protected from return when they can no 
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longer avail themselves of the protection of their own country and are in need of the 
protection of the country in which they seek asylum. 
However, while there is an obvious relationship between the prohibitions on 
refoulement contained explicitly in the Refugee Convention and implicit in the 
ECHR as this thesis examined, there is no uniform prohibition of refoulement. At 
first sight there are some obvious differences between the prohibition entailed in 
Article 33 Refugee Convention and that in Article 3 ECHR. First, the personal scope 
of Article 33 Refugee Convention is limited to refugees and does not apply to people 
in general. Secondly, it does not provide absolute protection but allows for 
exceptions. A closer look at the two prohibitions on refoulement reveals other 
potential differences. There is the issue of the harm from which a person is protected. 
Article 33 Refugee Convention protects a refugee from being persecuted for a 
specific reason while Article 3 ECHR protects a person from being subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
Relevant for this thesis is that in principle, the return of protection seekers to a 
third/intermediate country can be in conformity with the prohibition of refoulement 
under both regimes, even if no substantial examination of the protection claim has 
been carried out, as long as it has been established that the third/intermediate country 
will provide protection if necessary. A state where an application has been lodged, 
must treat the protection seeker as if he/she was entitled to protection, for the 
prohibitions on refoulement “in any manner whatsoever” forbids return, if it has not 
been established that the third state will offer effective protection from refoulement.  
It is important to distinguish between the substantive examination of the risk of 
persecution or serious harm, and assessment of the risk that the third state will expel 
the protection seeker contrary to the prohibitions of refoulement. 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the international human rights and 
refugee law examined:  
- First, migrants must be given a real opportunity to apply for asylum.  
- Prohibition on refoulement must always be respected, including indirect 
refoulement.  
- However, even if triggering the non-refoulement guarantee, this does not 
guarantee access to a full asylum procedure. It implies a duty to investigate 
the protection needs of the individual protection seeker against refoulement 
in the third/intermediate country concerned.  
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- In the context of the ECHR in particular, this duty was defined in detail, 
distinguishing between a risk of onward removal to the country of origin, 
and onward removal to an intermediate country. Evident from ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence, is that it works with a rebuttable presumption that states will 
abide by their obligations under international human rights and refugee law. 
This means; if there are indications that states have violated human rights 
law, the presumption no longer applies.  The sending state must thus 
examine whether the protection system of the third country provides the 
possibility of protection, as well as effective procedural safeguards to ensure 
protection, including an effective remedy against rejection, and probably 
status determination.  
- The T.I v. United Kingdom, M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece and Hirsi Jamaa v. 
Italy cases clearly illustrates that transfers to third countries without such 
safeguards will violate ECHR.  
- However, my analysis further led to the conclusion that, in principle, whether 
a third/intermediate country will undertake status determination does not 
determine the legality of expulsion to that country as long as effective 
protection is afforded without such a determination. In other words, as long 
as states respect the prohibition of direct and indirect refoulement, 
international human rights and refugee law does not prevent the continuous 
expulsion of a protection seeker from one country to another.  
- If the third country is not a party to relevant conventions, that fact must be 
considered in determining whether minimum legal requirements for return 
are met. 
- If effective protection is not afforded in the third/intermediate country, the 
application for protection from ill-treatment must be consider rigorously and 
independently on its substance. 
In sum, safety cannot be an automatic presumption. At a minimum, safety implies an 
effective form of protection and to which the individual can make a claim. Hence, 
expulsion without previous examination of the substance of the request can be 
compatible with the prohibitions of refoulement.  
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2.4 EU Law 
After examined the meaning of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum under 
international human rights and refugee law, it is now time to move on to the EU law.  
Within the aim to create a harmonized asylum system, the EU has created 
several legislations regulating refugee rights. EU legislation is divided in primary 
legislation embodied in the treaties, and secondary legislation in the form of 
regulations, directives and decisions, which are used to implement the policies set out 
in the treaties. Following subchapters are focusing on both EU primary law and the 
more detailed Common European Asylum System, CEAS. The last subchapters 
examine the safe third country concept, focusing on both its content and scope and 
critique raised against it.  
Before I get to grips with the EU law, I would like to emphasize that there are 
reasons to believe that the CJEU follows the main line of the well-established ECtHR 
case law, see the previous chapter 2.2.2.138 In the N.S. and M.E. joined cases, the 
CJEU clarified that Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the member 
state responsible under the Dublin regulation when the evidence shows – and the 
member state cannot be unaware of – systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure 
and reception conditions that could amount to a breach of Article 4 of the Charter 
(prohibition on torture). 139  
 
2.4.1 EU Primary Law 
The treaties constitute the European Union’s ‘primary legislation’, which is 
comparable to constitutional law at national level. They lay down the fundamental 
features of the Union, in particular the responsibilities of the various actors in the 
decision-making process, the legislative procedures under the Community system 
and the powers conferred on them. Relevant for this thesis is The Treaty of Lisbon 
and the EU Charter. 
To have an understanding of the EU primary law is important in the context of 
this thesis, because EU countries must respect the fundamental rights in the primary 
law when implementing agreements such as the EU/Turkey deal. Consequently, 
                                                
138 Mink (2012) p. 143. 
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returns can only be carried out on the basis of a return decision issued in accordance 
with these guarantees. The primary law further demonstrates the connection between 
the international and regional law covered in chapter 2.1-2.2, and the EU law.  
 
2.4.1.1 The Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon is the constitutional base of the EU, which amends two of the 
primary treaties of the EU; the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, also know as the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU), and the 1957 Treaty of Rome, also known as the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).140  
According to the TFEU:  
 
“The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection 
and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring 
compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July and the Protocol of 31 
January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.”141  
 
By virtue of the direct references to it in this article, international law may have 
effect within the EU.  
EU legislation does not take place in a legal vacuum and the TFEU does not 
provide any additional protection besides the provisions in the Refugee Convention 
relevant for this thesis. However, Article 78(1) just mentioned, refers to the EU’s 
development of subsidiary protection and temporary protection that is something that 
the Refugee Convention does not cover. It is important to keep in mind that 
obligations under the relevant international treaties, remains unaffected by the 
adoption of any subsequent treaties concluded by EU member states.142  
 
2.4.1.2 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
Each and every provision enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (EU Charter) is relevant, and only applicable, when the member 
states are implementing and applying EU-law.143  
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The EU Charter regulates both the right to asylum,144 prohibits collective 
expulsion and codifies the principle of non-refoulement, 145  which serves as 
safeguards for the respect of protection seeker’s human rights. Regarding the right to 
asylum in Article 18, it consists of two elements. First, it determines the right to 
asylum. Secondly, it imposes the obligation to “guarantee” this right, “with due 
respect” for the rules of the Refugee Convention and “in accordance with” the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. What does this mean? While the reference to 
the “right to asylum” at first glance appears expansive, the EU Charter seeks only to 
consolidate existing fundamental EU rights rather than elaborate or amend them. 
From the preamble it follows that the EU Charter solely refers to a “reaffirmation” of 
rights as they result from the member states’ international obligations, the ECHR, the 
Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law 
of the CJEU and the ECtHR, and the Charter’s role to make these existing rights 
more visible.146  
 Battjes argues that it would be a bold step to say that Article 18 recognizes a 
right to claim protection, it is limited to a procedural right to apply for asylum, 
rather than a substantive right to obtain it. Reading the provision otherwise to the 
effect that every refugee has a right to status determination and cant hence be 
expelled to a third country would run counter to Article 63 establishing the European 
Community, that presupposes that Member States can expel refugees.147 “The right to 
asylum” implies when expelling refugees, according to Battjes, that member states 
must “guarantee” that those refugees have access to asylum, that is to durable 
solutions, and appropriate secondary rights. 148 In summary, Article 18 has one 
important implication for the application of the exception of the safe third country 
next to the obligations under international law: it requires that the right to an 
“appropriate” solution be guaranteed in the intermediate country. Arguably, a 
country offers “appropriate” protection only if it treats applicants in accordance with 
“basic human rights standards”.149 
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2.4.2 EU Secondary Law 
After the examination of that the rights to seek asylum and have your application 
examined under the EU primary law, I will move on to examine the right to seek 
asylum and to have the substance examined under Common European Asylum 
System, which is a part of EU Secondary legislation made by the EU institutions. 
Secondary legislation is the third major source of EU law after the treaties (primary 
legislation) and international agreements. It comprises: 
- binding legal instruments (regulations, directives and decisions)  
- non-binding instruments (resolutions, opinions) 
 
2.4.2.1 The Common European Asylum System 
As a result of increasing numbers of asylum seekers in the EU in the 1990’s, asylum 
emerged as a highly politicized European issue. In 1999, the European Council’s 
Tampere milestones included a commitment to the Refugee Convention and 
international human rights standards by reaffirming the fundamental right to seek 
asylum: 
 
“The aim is a open and secure European Union, fully committed to the 
obligations of the Geneva refugee Convention and other relevant human rights 
instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity. 
A common approach must also be developed to ensure the integration into our 
societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the 
Union.”150 
 
Thus, the desire for a common asylum system appears to be based on justice, fairness 
and solidarity. From this stemmed a new body of secondary legislation based on 
“minimum standards”.151 These Directives applies to Member States, which has to 
implement them into their national legislation. The Directives are binding as to the 
result to be achieved, which mean that Member States can, by their own accord, 
decide how to implement the rules.152  
                                                
150 Precidency Conclusions – Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, SN 
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[1992] OJ C 224/6.  
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CEAS is primarily constructed upon the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD), 
Qualification Directive (QD), Receptions Directive (RD) and the Dublin regulations. 
This thesis covers the recast directives. The continuing focus will be on the QD and 
APD as they are most relevant for the purpose of this thesis. Those instruments 
provide rules for which country that have responsibility for a protection claim and 
obligations regarding access to asylum procedures.   
 
2.4.2.2 The Qualification Directive 
This subchapter will take a look at the Qualification Directive’s scope and content. 
The QD defines the criteria that protection seekers need to meet to qualify as 
refugees or as persons otherwise in need of international protection, and also the 
content of rights that come with that status.153   
The main objective of the QD is, on the one hand, to ensure that Member 
States apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of 
international protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure that a minimum level of 
benefits is available for those persons in all member states.154 
The QD emphasises in the preamble that the Refugee Convention provide the 
cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. 155 
Furthermore, it defines international protection in Article 2(a) as ‘refugee status and 
subsidiary protection status’. If the applicant qualifies as a refugee or someone 
eligible of subsidiary protection – he/she shall be granted this protection in 
accordance with Chapters II and III if a refugee, or if eligible for subsidiary 
protection in accordance with Chapters II and V.156  
Article 15 under chapter V stipulates serious harm as a qualification for 
subsidiary protection. It provides that Member States cannot return individuals to 
‘the death penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the country of origin, or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s 
life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict’.  
As soon as possible after international protection has been granted, member 
states shall issue to beneficiaries of refugee and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection 
                                                
153 QD Preamble recital 12; Gil-Bazo, Refugee status, subsidiary protection, and the right to 
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status a residence permit which must be valid for at least 3 years and 1 year. 157 
 
2.4.2.2.1 Critique against the QD 
O’Nions has raised concern over the Qualification Directive’s compatibility with 
fundamental human rights norms. The absolute character of Article 3 ECHR is not 
reflected in the QD, which thereby continues to include the exceptions provided in 
the Refugee Convention.158 Article 21 QD states: 
 
1.   Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance 
with their international obligations. 
2.   Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 
1, Member States may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, 
when: 
(a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to the to 
the security of the Member State in which he or she is present; or 
(b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State. 
 
Consequently, 21(1) requires the member states to comply with their international 
obligations, but since Article 21(2) provides exceptions from the principle of non-
refoulement, it unsurprisingly undermines those obligations. Article 21(1)’s reference 
to obligations under international law means that the QD recognizes that individuals 
excluded from subsidiary protection under Article 17 may nevertheless be protected 
from removal. Thus, subsidiary protection, as governed by the QD, is not intended to 
cover all instances where a state is prohibited under international law from returning 
an individual to his country of origin, just those where a need for international 
protection (as defined by the QD)159  is considered to exist. Although the QD 
incorporates the principle of non-refoulement it fails to explicitly acknowledge the 
absolute nature of the principle where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
the persons concerned would face death or ill-treatment if refouled to their country of 
origin or to a presumed safe-third country.160 The QD is therefore not compliant with 
                                                
157 QD Article 24.  
158 O’Nions, (2014), p. 95-96.  
159 Mandal, Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (“Complementary 
Protection”) (2005), para. 45. 
160 Mink (2012) p. 146. 
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the absolute right provided under Article 3 of the ECHR.161  
The CJEU attempted, in the Elgafaji judgement162, to draw a distinction 
between the QD and Article 3 of the ECHR. The CJEU assessed that Article 15(c) 
concerning the contents of serious harm, in conjunction with Article 2(d) concerning 
the definition of refugee, of the QD were fully compatible with the ECHR. 163 
However, as J.Mink stresses, the implementation of the principles in the QD are 
seriously hindered, further eroded if not made impossible by the fact that EU allows 
for various border and specific procedures making possible the avoidance of the 
meaningful assessment of claims by e.g. the application of ill-defined concepts such 
as the safe third country notion (discussed further down) as hardly rebuttable 
presumptions. As ECRE rightly pointed out: a CEAS based on the highest possible 
standards will be of little use to refugees if it becomes impossible for them to reach 
the EU.164 This leads us in to the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
 
2.4.2.3 The Asylum Procedures Directive 
The Asylum Procedures Directive is the instrument used by EU Member States to 
determine the measures for granting or withdrawing refugee status and subsidiary 
protection under the Qualification Directive and to ascertain whether protection-
seekers can be removed to a safe third country responsible for the examination of 
their international protection claim. 165  
The APD has a major impact on access to determination procedures and to 
facilitate access to procedures for those who express the wish to request international 
protection within the EU.166 However, many provisions can also be used to keep 
protection seekers from their right of access to procedures.167  
The APD has attracted much criticism since its adoption. It has been described 
as a “catalogue of national practice which allows significant departures from 
accepted refugee and human rights law”168 and a “betrayal of the EU’s promise to 
                                                
161 Ibid. p. 146-147.   
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guarantee fundamental rights.”169 O’Nions write that the criticism centre around two 
key aspects, the use of accelerated procedures and the use of so called safe countries, 
relevant for this thesis.170 
The APD is nevertheless based on the full and inclusive application of the 
Refugee Convention thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement. 171  The 
preamble states that in the interests of a correct recognition of those persons in need 
of protection as refugees, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention 
or as persons eligible for subsidiary protection, every applicant should have an 
effective access to procedures, the opportunity to cooperate and properly 
communicate with the competent authorities so as to present the relevant facts of his 
or hers case and sufficient procedural guarantees to pursue his or her case throughout 
all stages of the procedure.172 In other words, every person applying for international 
protection has the right to have their application examined according to the APD.  
Article 6 APD provides that member states are required to refer a person who 
has expressed an intention to apply for international protection to the asylum 
procedure by informing him/her as to where and how the application for international 
protection may be lodged. This shall ensure that there are authorities that can register 
and treat applications and make sure that the applicant has an effective opportunity to 
lodge their application as soon as possible.  
Article 8 requires in practice that member states have to be proactive in 
identifying potential protection seekers, inform him/her about the right to apply for 
international protection and advise him/her on how to make the application.  
Article 9 further provides that all persons have the right to remain in the 
member state pending the examination of their application.  
Article 10 obliges national authorities to take a decision after an appropriate 
examination of a claim, comprising of an individual, objective and impartial 
assessment.173  
The APD further confirms certain basic procedural guarantees in chapter II, 
such as the right to a personal interview,174 the right to receive information and to 
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communicate with UNHCR175 and the right to a lawyer.176  
However, member states have a wide scope to apply accelerated procedures 
with reduced safeguards in practice according to Articles 32 and 33. According to 
Article 33, states may decide not to provide protection to a person on the assumption 
that the person can find protection in another country through which he/she might 
have transited prior entering the EU, a so called safe third country. Access to the 
asylum procedure may be denied altogether under this rule. This safe third country 
exception is in the centre of attention of this thesis, why next chapter will examine 
this in detail. 
2.4.2.3.1 Safe third country exception  
 
The principle of access to a fair and efficient procedure for determination of 
protection claims, has long been a cardinal principle in UNHCR’s protection policy, 
and has been endorsed with equal consistency by the UN General Assembly. 177 The 
concept of a safe third country however, is used as a procedural mechanism for 
rejection of protection seekers and returning them to other states that are said to have 
the primary response for them – keeping protection seekers from the procedural door.  
According to Articles 33(2)(c) APD the Member States do not have to examine 
the substance of the claim if a safe third country can be found. Hence, when the 
member states return protection seekers under to this arrangement, they have not 
substantively assessed whether the alien has well-founded fear of persecution or runs 
a real risk of ill-treatment in his/hers country of origin.178 
EXCOM Conclusion No. 58 constituted the first attempt to defining what a “safe” 
country is. The Conclusion provides that protection by the third country should entail 
permission to enter and remain safety in the country, non-refoulement and treatment 
in accordance with basic human rights standards until a durable situation is found, as 
well as absence of persecution or threats to safety or freedom.179 
The practice of returning protection seekers to safe third countries is a 
European invention, with – as Costello argues – scant foundation in international 
law. Ostensibly, Article 31 Refugee Convention, leaves space for such practices, by 
providing that: 
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“The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their 
life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in 
their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without 
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” 
 
The reference to “coming directly” is said to intimate a requirement that protection 
seekers seek protection at the first opportunity.180  
The safe third country exception provides a lower level of fundamental rights 
protection and a number of important aspects of asylum procedures have been left 
out. The APD contains five safe country exceptions. Nevertheless, relevant for this 
thesis - and also the most controversial181 - is the exception covered in Article 
33(2)(c) in conjunction with Article 38 – titled “The safe third country concept”.  
This allows a member state to declare as inadmissible the protection claims of 
persons for whom a safe third country (which is not a member state) can be 
identified, either through transit or access to that country. Member States do not have 
to examine the merits of a claim for protection “where it can be reasonably assumed 
that another country would do the examination or provide sufficient protection”.182  
 
2.4.2.3.1.1 Safety criteria  
Article 38 APD does not explicitly require that the third country is party to relevant 
instruments of international law to be considered safe. A third country cannot qualify 
as safe pursuant to Article 38 because of mere ratification of relevant instruments of 
international law; rather, it must meet material standards. 183 There are five 
substantive cumulative principles that must be respected in that country according to 
Article 38 ADP: 
 
1.   Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent 
authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in 
accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned: 
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(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and  
(b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU; and 
(c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is 
respected; and  
(d) the prohibition on removal in breach of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law is respected; and  
(e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive 
protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 
 
These criteria explicitly reiterate the prohibition on refoulement in Article 33 
Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the ECHR. As I stated, its not required that the 
third state has actually ratified these two conventions; important seems to be that it 
de facto adhere to the listed obligations. 184 Furthermore, it only demands the 
“possibility” to request for refugee status. The UNHCR affirms that the notion of a 
safe third country should be appropriately applied so as not to result in improper 
denial of access to asylum procedures, or to violations of the principle of non-
refoulement.185 Does the safe third country exception as enclosed in the APD, allow 
the intermediate country in its turn to expel the applicant to a fourth state? Arguably 
it does as the prohibitions on indirect refoulement in (c) and (d) suppose so. Article 
38(1)(e) requires mere “the possibility to request refugee status”, not the opportunity 
to request it: the intermediate country should run examination procedures, but it is 
not required that it should examine the refugee status of the applicant. 186 The basic 
principle is thus that the intermediate state is able to grant effective protection to 
refugees. What is also clear is that effective protection should not be solely equated 
with absence of persecution pursuant to Article 1 and 33 Refugee Convention. 187 
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2.4.2.3.1.2 Procedural safeguards 
Application of the safe third country exception rises yet another question: how 
should the sending state assess the safety of the third state? Consequently, the 
application of the safe third country exception is subject to a number of procedural 
requirements in Article 38(2) APD:  
 
(a) rules requiring a connection between the applicant and the third country 
concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to 
that country; 
(b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy themselves 
that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or to a 
particular applicant. Such methodology shall include case-by-case consideration 
of the safety of the country for a particular applicant and/or national designation 
of countries considered to be generally safe; 
(c) rules in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination of 
whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a 
minimum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application of the safe third 
country concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in his or her 
particular circumstances. The applicant shall also be allowed to challenge the 
existence of a connection between him or her and the third country in accordance 
with point (a). 
 
Thus, the safe third country exception applies in case “connection” between the 
protection seeker and the third country can be determined. The APD however, does 
not specify when this connection is established. It simply states that is must be 
“reasonable for that person to go to that country”. Coleman observes that the APD 
thereby fails to decide the central question of whether protection seekers may be 
expelled to safe third countries through which they merely travelled. It leaves this 
question to the national law of the Member States, whilst not excluding the 
possibility of expulsion due to transit through a third country.188 UNHCR on the 
other side considers it inappropriate to derive any responsibility for considering an 
asylum application from the fact that the applicant has been merely present in the 
territory of another State. Mere presence in a territory is often the result of fortuitous 
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circumstances, and does not necessarily imply the existence of any meaningful link 
or connection.189 
Subparagraph (b) requires that the Member States must be satisfied that the 
safe third country concept may be applied. To “satisfy” is a subjective criterion, and 
lighter than, for example, a requirement to “establish” or “demonstrate” the safety of 
a country.190 Important is that the APD doesn’t oblige Member States to provide for 
an individualized safety examination to conclude that a country is “safe”– this 
follows from the continuing of the subparagraph (b) that allows for a national 
designation of countries considered to be generally safe. In such case, no 
examination of fear or risk takes place. Instead, the sending state assumes that the 
intermediate country will not expel the protection seeker contrary to any of it’s 
obligations under international law and removal to the third state does therefore not 
harm the protection seeker.191 
Nonetheless, according to the preamble to the APD, the safe third country 
exception may apply only “where that particular applicant would be safe in in the 
third country concerned”. 192  The APD hence provides for the possibility of rebuttal, 
which is addressed in Article 38(2)(b) & (c). Article 38(2)(b) requires that the 
Member States adopt some “methodology” for assessment of the safety of the third 
country.193 These provisions means that, if a protection seeker would challenge a 
safety determination considering the particularities of his/hers case, then an 
individualized examination must be provided for, in appeal, in accordance with 
subparagraph (c). This requirement was inserted in the draft to comply with 
international legal obligations, and prevent denying access to asylum procedures.194  
In other words, there are no requirements that a member state must guarantee 
an individual safety examination under the APD, thus permitting administrative 
decisions based solely on a general safety determination to begin with, “satisfying” 
the authorities that a particular third country is safe for that individual.195 Member 
States are thus permitted to declare third states generally safe for return – as long as 
they are satisfied that the substantive requirements in Article 38(1) are fulfilled.196 If 
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the applicant thereafter challenges a negative decision, then that designation can no 
longer be considered as relevant. Member states should ensure that a review of the 
human rights situation is conducted if becomes aware of a significant change in the 
human rights situation in the “safe” country (they would no longer be “satisfied” that 
safe).197  
Questionable is whether this safeguard is enough to ensure that the principle of 
non-refoulement is not violated which will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 5.198 
As Battjes identifies, Article 38 seems to waver between the general and individual 
approach to assessment of safety. He further observes that Article 38(1) is couched in 
ambiguous terms. The competent authorities must be satisfied that the applicant “will 
be treated” in accordance with the requirements in 38(1), which focus on the 
particular individual. But on the other hand the procedural requirements in 38(2) are 
stated in an abstract kind of way.199 
 
2.4.2.3.1.3 Critique against the safe third country exception  
There is a debate over the right of access to asylum procedures and the related 
question of responsibility to substantively examine protection requests. Both the 
Executive Committee and the UN General Assembly have repeatedly endorsed the 
general principle of access to asylum procedures.200 As I concluded above, the 
principle of refoulement is a fundamental requirement when returning to a safe third 
country, and furthermore, in principle, doesn’t have to stand in the way of 
contemplating protection elsewhere. A state is not obliged to examine the substance 
of the claim, unless minded to return the individual to a country in which his/hers life 
or freedom may be threatened.  
The safe third country concept has been criticised numerous times in the 
literature and has remained a concern according to ECRE.201 This criticism has 
mainly involved the risk of both direct and indirect refoulement,202 lack of an 
individual assessments and has further been perceived by many to restrict the access 
to a fair and effective asylum procedure.203 The ECRE has raised concern regarding 
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that the procedure has been shifted towards techniques to screen out as many 
applications as possible rather than focusing on identifying persons in need of 
protection.204 Also UNHCR and several NGOs were critical before the passing of the 
concept because they feared that it would deny access to protection. Similarly, 
Gammeltoft-Hansen argues that the process within the EU of harmonizing the area 
on asylum and immigration in itself can be described as to prevent access to asylum 
procedures.205  
To cover the main features of this criticism has value in this thesis as it 
highlights the different perspectives that partly characterize the international human 
rights and refugee law as well as EU law. As O'Nions have pointed out, generalizing 
concepts, such as the safe third country concept, have come to underpin the asylum 
regulations in the EU, which divert from the individual assessment when determining 
issues related to asylum claims and non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention 
and ECHR.206There are legal instruments in place preventing access to asylum 
procedures 207 and the criticism evokes inevitably the question if EU law really can 
be considered to be in conformity with international law.  
Costello argues that safe third country practices undermine both access to and 
the integrity of asylum procedures in the enlarged EU. It increases the likelihood of 
error in asylum determination as it has proved to be unjust, unfair and inefficient, and 
inevitably lead to refoulement as refugees are deported or refused access to proper 
procedures.208  
The ECtHR has stated that states cannot escape responsibility for refoulement 
by relying automatically on the fact that the country has ratified the Refugee 
Convention.209 Costello has also argued that there are facts suggesting that some EU 
neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, really are not safe. 210This will be further 
discussed in the following chapter. She also emphasises the importance of the 
individual responsibility of States, as stressed in the jurisprudence of ECJ and 
ECtHR. 211States cannot hide behind something as the safe country concept. The 
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responsibility and obligations under the principle of non-refoulement remains.212 To 
generally assume that a country is safe and that collectively send people back to the 
"safe countries" is something that, according to critics, might constitute refoulement 
in itself.213 The generalized presumptions the concept is based on, is considered to 
challenge the fundamental building blocks of international protection, in particular 
the need for individual decisions and fair proceedings.214 As we can see, the criticism 
revolves around this particular matter; the lack in the procedure of an individual 
assessment of a claim. A country may be safe for some people, and for others not.215 
UNHCR has insisted that the analysis of whether the protection seeker can be sent to 
a third country for determination of the claim must be done on an individualized 
basis.216  
Another argument raised regarding individual assessments is that the safety 
standards differ so much between states, an individual assessment is therefore needed 
to live up to international obligations it is argued.217 Thus, variations in protection 
standards may indicate that the assumption of safe countries is dangerous.218  
UNHCR's Executive Committee have in a conclusion emphasized that the 
concept of safe third country should not be applied so that it result in improper denial 
of access to asylum procedures, or to violations of the principle of non-
refoulement.219 In this context, Costello has pointed out that many countries have an 
asylum law, but which is implemented in such a limited way that this cannot provide 
access to an appropriate asylum procedure.220To have a statutory asylum procedure is 
not something that ensures safe proceedings.221 
In sum, the APD provides a right for asylum-seekers to seek protection and get 
their application examined but at the same time, it also provides a right for the 
Member States to apply the safe third country exception and declare the application 
as inadmissible.  
                                                
212 van Selm (2001) p. 22 para.50; T.I v. United Kingdom, p. 14; M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece 
para.359 . 
213 Hathaway (2005) p. 325; O´Nions (2014) p. 63.   
214 O´Nions (2014) p. 119; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) p. 392.   
215 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) p. 392 
216 UNHCR’s observations on the European Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive 
on minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status 
(COM(2000) 578 Final, 2000, para. 33. 
217 Hurwitz (2009) p. 221.   
218 O´Nions (2014) p. 63, 103-104.   
219 UNHCR, EXCOM conclusion No. 87 (L) section (j).   
220 Costello (2016) p. 254.   
221 Peers (2015) p. 271.   
 59 
That being said, does it follow that a state may apply the exception of the safe 
third country only after an individual examination of each and every protection 
request? I concluded above in chapter 2.3 that in principle there is no duty to 
examine the substance of a request for asylum under international law. Partially I 
agree with the critics on the point that effective protection from indirect refoulement 
entails that the sending state should establish that the intermediate country is actually 
safe for the particular applicant – which amounts to a duty to perform an individual 
examination at least to the safety of the intermediate state. However I would not go 
so far as suggesting that international law necessarily requires a complete 
examination of the request. I tend to agree with Battjes argument that absolute trust 
that an intermediate state is safe cannot take place, which is also evident from the 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR. However, requiring examination of each and every 
case is too strict: it renders all formal obligations nugatory. Battjes continues by 
arguing that some sort of intermediary position between an individual and general 
assessment is arguably defensible under international law. Thus, when the authorities 
in a state receive a request for protection, they can declare it inadmissible and thus 
refuse to examine the substance of the claim on the grounds that another country is 
responsible for this examination under the third safe country exception. The state can 
base this on the assumption that the intermediate country is prima facie safe, 
however this trust cannot be absolute. This means that the applicant must have the 
opportunity to rebut this assumption and present counter evidence to the effect that 
the third country is not safe.  
In general, the same safeguards that are required for determining the substance 
of a asylum request should be required for the determination of whether 
contemplating protection to a intermediate country – basically; will the intermediate 
country afford the applicant effective protection?222 
If he/she succeeds, the exception of the safe third country cannot apply (and 
the sending state could return the person only if the substantial examination of the 
claim shows that he/she has no well-founded fear of persecution and risk of serious 
harm).223 Similarly, UNHCR has advised against a general safety determination with 
safe third country “lists,”224but accepts their use as long as the asylum procedures 
ultimately allow for an individualized assessment into whether the country is actually 
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safe for the particular applicant.225 Consequently, an applicant must at least be given 
an opportunity to rebut the presumption of safety.226 After taking account of the 
understandings presented in chapter 2, I consider this approach to be safe and sound 
as it demands and allows for an individual assessment, if proper counter-arguments 
are presented that this is necessary.  
2.5 Conclusion EU Law 
Even if the EU law is its own legal system, it is clear that the safeguarding of 
individual rights in the EU member states are partially determined by common 
standards of international law. EU’s asylum policy is building upon, and shall 
correspond to, the Refugee Convention and ECHR. 
Nevertheless, my analysis demonstrated that despite the importance of the 
international obligations stemming from the non-refoulement principle examined in 
previous chapter, with the development of the CEAS, and in particular the adoption 
of the EU Qualification and Procedures Directives, a right to seek and enjoy asylum 
has been formulated in EU legislation. The right to seek asylum is further guaranteed 
under the EU Charter, which also incorporates the obligation of non-refoulement.  
Nevertheless, the safe third country exception in the APD makes it possible for a 
member state to declare an application inadmissible and deny access to parts of the 
asylum procedures.  
My analyse shows that the international law sets a minimum level, which the 
member states cannot go below and neither can invoke secondary EU law to derogate 
from the obligations under the ECHR or the Refugee Convention. 
The EU asylum system includes a right to have one’s claim for protection 
examined according to certain minimum standards and furthermore a right to refugee 
status or subsidiary protection if the required conditions are met. However, as 
thoroughly examined, the APD includes exceptions to when a member state doesn’t 
have to examine an application request in substance. As international law in principle 
allows for expulsion of protection seekers to an intermediate country, this doesn’t 
have to be problematic. Beyond the requirements of effective protection deduced 
from international human rights and refugee law, the right to asylum of Article 18 
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EU Charter requires that the protection seeker will enjoy appropriate status in the 
third state, and thus be treated in accordance with basic human rights standards. 
The safe third country exception in Article 38 APD authorizes a state to return 
a person claiming refugee status to any safe state through which he or she may have 
passed en route to the country in which he/she is now present. To qualify as a safe 
third country, there must be a determination, satisfying the authorities that the 
destination country is prepared to consider the applicant’s refugee claim, and will not 
expose the claimant to persecution, risk of torture or related ill-treatment, or 
refoulement.   
When applying the safe third country concept all basic principles and 
guarantees laid down in Chapter II of the APD must be respected as the examination 
of asylum applications carries with it certain obligations on member states and, 
subsequently, rights for individual applicants.  
The safe third country notion is the legal basis for the EU/Turkey deal. To 
fulfil the aim of this thesis we must therefore consider whether the safe third country 
exceptions contained in the APD reflect at least the minimum requirements 
prescribed by the international and regional law examined, and do not suggest 
anything which falls short of that standard. That comparison takes place in chapter 5, 
but before that it is time to be familiarized with the EU/Turkey deal and the situation 
for refugees in Turkey.  
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3 The EU/Turkey deal 
Faced with an increasing refugee crisis, with desperate people trying to reach Europe, 
EU have focused on reaching agreements with Turkey to prevent irregular departures 
from its territory. On 15 October 2015, the EU and Turkey agreed on a Joint Action 
Plan to prevent irregular migration from Turkey to the EU.227 In it, Turkey agreed to 
intensify its efforts to restrict the movement of people through its territory to Europe 
and to readmit from the EU all irregular migrants who had transited through Turkey 
and who were found not to be in need of international protection by EU member 
states. In the months that followed the Joint Action Plan, the intended decrease in 
irregular arrivals to Europe did not take place, and the EU and Turkey therefore 
announced the EU/Turkey deal as a second, far-reaching agreement.  
This chapter will highlight relevant aspects of the EU/Turkey deal of March 18 
2016228, which has aroused considerable legal and political controversy. However, 
before we get to grips with the EU/Turkey deal itself, a brief overview of the existing 
readmission agreement between Turkey and Greece is appropriate.  
 
3.1 The existing Greece-Turkey 
readmission agreement  
Regardless the legal and political turmoil following the announcement of the 
EU/Turkey deal, some elements in the deal are not new. Turkey’s cooperation on 
return of migrants has not only been with the EU. Greece and Turkey has dealt with 
this question in over a decade, with a bilateral readmission agreement signed as early 
as 2001. Under this existing bilateral readmission agreement, irregular migrants (in 
this context referring to people who did not claim asylum and people whose 
applications for asylum were judged to be unfounded) could be returned.229 This 
readmission agreement was however succeeded by the EU-Turkey Readmission 
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228 European Council (2016), EU-Turkey Statement, (18 March 2016).  
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Treaty 1 June 2016.230 This treaty231 has applied since October 2014. Turkey agreed 
to readmit its own citizens straight away, but wanted to wait three years before it 
could be possible to return nationals of other nationalities under the agreement. 
However, in light of the development of the refugee crisis, EU didn’t want to wait 
that long until it could return third-state citizens back to Turkey. 
Essential for this thesis is that asylum seekers are not covered by these 
readmission agreements; the legal basis for their return - if their application is 
deemed inadmissible - is the safe third country exception in the APD. As this thesis 
consciously omitted an examination of other migrants than refugees and asylum 
seekers, I will not examine this existing readmission agreement further but move on 
to the EU/Turkey deal on 18 March.   
 
 
3.2 Documents 
Even though the core parts of the EU-Turkey deal is concluded by the European 
Council meeting on 18 March 2016232, it must be read alongside with the European 
Council Conclusions of 17-18 March 2016233 , where the Council confirms its 
comprehensive strategy to tackle the migration crisis, and the European Commission 
Communication “Next Operational Steps in EU-Turkey Cooperation in the Field of 
Migration”234, where the Commission inter alia examines the principle of returning 
all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands thoroughly.  
3.3 Content 
The deal contains of three major elements:  
 
1. Return of all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands 
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2.  Resettlement of Syrians from Turkey to the EU and, 
3.  Prevention of departure from Turkey. 
 
The focus of this thesis is on the first element that will be identified in this chapter, 
the complete deal is however to be found in Annex 1. 
As we will see, under the terms of this deal, certain categories of people 
crossing irregularly from Turkey into Greek islands after 20 March 2016 will be 
returned to Turkey. In exchange, the EU promised to, i.e., resettle one Syrian refugee 
from Turkey to the EU for each Syrian refugee returned from Greece to Turkey, 
grant visa-free travel for Turkish nationals by June 2016 and revive the stalled 
negotiations for Turkey to accede to the EU. The remaining of this subsection will 
identify the relevant key elements of the deal.235 
 
Return of all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek Islands  
o All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands 
as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. 
o This will take place in full accordance with EU and international 
law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants 
will be protected in accordance with the relevant international 
standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. 
o It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary 
to end the human suffering and restore public order 
o Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and 
any application for asylum will be processed individually by the 
Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR.  
o Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been 
found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said 
directive236 will be returned to Turkey.  
o Turkey and Greece, assisted by EU institutions and agencies, will 
take the necessary steps and agree any necessary bilateral 
arrangements, including the presence of Turkish officials on Greek 
islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016, to 
ensure liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these 
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arrangements. The costs of the return operations of irregular 
migrants will be covered by the EU. 
 
3.4 Scope of the EU/Turkey Deal 
To begin with, the actual form and legal basis of the EU/Turkey deal is not clear and 
therefore important to highlight. There are two viewings upon the deal’s form and 
legal basis. First, Peers – a professor of EU and Human Rights Law at the University 
of Essex –claims that the deal has the form of a statement.237 He argues, “since the 
agreement will take the form of a ‘statement’, in my view it will not as such be 
legally binding. Therefore there will be no procedure to approve it at either EU or 
national level, besides its endorsement by the summit meeting. Nor can it be legally 
challenged as such. However, the individual elements of it – new Greek, Turkish and 
EU laws (or their implementation), and the further implementation of the EU/Turkey 
readmission agreement – will have to be approved at the relevant level, or 
implemented in individual cases if they are already in force.” According to Peers’s 
argument, the deal is not a legal instrument that is possible to test judicially.238  
A second way to assess the EU/Turkey deal, is presented by Den Heijer and 
Spijkerboer- assistant professor of international law at the Universiteit van 
Amsterdam and professor of migration law at the Vrije Universiteit - who states that 
the deal could constitute a treaty and, as such, be unlawful because the EU’s 
procedure for negotiating and concluding treaties with third countries, laid down in 
in Article 218 TFEU, has not been followed.239 According to the authors, the form 
and legal basis of the deal and the lack of consultation with the European Parliament 
raise serious questions about the rule of law and has negative impact on European 
democracy. 
Continuing, another problematic aspect of the EU/Turkey deal is that the 
duration of these arrangements is not specified.240 The deal explicitly states that the 
return of “all irregular migrants” shall be a “temporary and extraordinary measure”. 
Concern has been raised that measures such as these, even if temporary, may have a 
more durable application and possibly providing future precedential value, such as 
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has been verbalized by Italy.241 
Further uncertainties are found in the specific geographical scope of the deal. 
The Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy242 case ruled that States are obligated to grant 
protection seekers the possibility to apply for asylum regardless if intercepted at the 
border, on board vessels or in international waters. Therefore the application of the 
EU/Turkey deal to those irregular migrants “crossing from Turkey into the Greek 
islands”, doesn’t fully mirror that obligation.243 
The relevant subject of the deal is “all new irregular migrants”. Many are those 
who criticise this paragraph. To quote Peers: “To be frank, anyone with a legal 
qualification who signed off on this first sentence should hang their head in 
shame”.244 The contentious compliance of this provision with international law will 
be discussed in the x.   
 
3.5 Legal safeguards and the safe third 
country exception   
The EU/Turkey deal states: “migrants not applying for asylum or whose application 
has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive (the 
APD) will be returned to Turkey.” According to the European Commission 
Communication,245 the return to Turkey of all irregular migrants and asylum seekers 
newly arriving in Greece must be carried out in respect for European and 
international law. It continued by stating that it is a fundamental requirement flowing 
from the ECHR and the EU Charter that every case needs to be treated individually. 
In that regard, the APD lays down the particular legal and procedural parameters to 
be respected. Consequently, according to the Communication, there is therefore no 
question of applying a "blanket" return policy, as this would run contrary to these 
legal requirements.246 
However, the Communication further refers to the safe third country exception 
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in the APD and confirms that this will be applied to persons that could have applied 
for protection in Turkey because they are guaranteed effective access to protection 
there. 247 The application of this exception shall however be in accordance with all 
procedural guarantees as identified in this thesis’s chapter 2, inter alia, registration, 
personal interview and appeal. The substantial requirements are also underlined in 
the Communication, stating that before returning a person in need of international 
protection Member States need to be satisfied that the third country will respect a set 
of standards concerning fundamental rights, non-discrimination, and respect for 
international law.  
Consequently, as the EU/Turkey deal should be read together with this 
Communication – it has identified the legal requirements of readmitting a protection 
seeker to Turkey, and as long as Greece and Turkey respect these safeguards, this 
scheme will be in accordance with European and international law.  
However, is the reassurance that all migrants will be protected in accordance 
with the relevant international standards, enough to consider Turkey as a safe country 
of return? I will discuss this in chapter 5. Before that, the actual conditions and 
practices in Turkey will be examined.  
 
 
                                                
247 ibid. p.3 
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4 Treatment in Turkey  
The contours of the 18 March Agreement between EU and Turkey meant in effect 
that the EU as a whole agreed to recognize and treat Turkey as a safe country of 
return. Apparent from the examination of the international and regional framework in 
previous chapters, there are certain requirements that must be in place in the third 
country before it’s qualified as “safe”. Consequently, this chapter will examine 
relevant aspects of Turkish law and asylum procedures - as well as potential 
protection concerns – for the purpose of assessing the legality of return of protection 
seekers to Turkey in section 5; Is the deal in compliance with refugee and human 
rights law?  
As I demonstrated, important criterion for “safety” is that the asylum 
procedures are available, and the access to a fair and effective international 
protection system is provided and that the system in place should be able to 
guarantee a proper review of an international protection request and/or deportation 
order, satisfying the needs of legal certainty and protection required in such 
matters.248 The Asylum Procedures Directive explicitly states that the safe third 
country concept may only be applied where a number of safeguards are fulfilled, 
including respect for the principle of non-refoulement and the possibility to request 
and receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention. This section will 
accordingly highlight relevant aspects of the situation in Turkey, focusing on above 
mention criteria.  
 
4.1 Turkish asylum legislation  
As a gateway between Europe, Asia, and Africa, Turkey has historically been a focal 
point for transcontinental migration and its location places it on a prime route for 
migrants looking to enter Europe.249 Turkey currently hosts both a mass-influx 
refugee population from neighbouring Syria and a surging number of individually 
arriving asylum seekers of other nationalities, most principally originating from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia, among other. These two populations of protection 
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seekers are subject to two different sets of asylum rules and procedures. As such, the 
Turkish asylum system has a dual structure.250 
4.1.1 The Geographical limitation  
In April 2013 Turkey adopted a comprehensive, EU-inspired new Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which establishes a dedicated legal 
framework for asylum in Turkey and affirms Turkey’s obligations towards all 
persons in need of international protection, regardless of country of origin, at the 
level of binding domestic law.251 
Unlike the majority of signatory countries to the Refugee Convention, Turkey 
maintains a geographical limitation, affording refugee status only to individuals from 
European countries. As a result, asylum seekers from non-European countries are 
expected to be resettled elsewhere, or returned to their countries of origin. If this will 
allow these refugees to remain indefinitely and integrate into Turkish society is 
unclear.252  
 
4.1.2 Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection  
The law refers to the principle of non-refoulement, meaning that a correct refugee 
reception according to the law cannot violate against non-refoulement.253 As for the 
right to seek asylum, the law explicitly entitles every foreigner or stateless person the 
right to apply for asylum.254However, Turkey implements a temporary protection 
regime for refugees from Syria on a prima facie, group-basis, which grants 
beneficiaries right to legal stay as well as some level of access to basic rights and 
services.255 On the other hand, asylum seekers from other countries of origin are 
expected to apply for an individual “international protection” status under LFIP. 256 
Non-European refugees, acquire “conditional refugee” status under the 
“international protection” regime. This application concerns a temporary residence in 
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Turkey until resettlement to a final asylum country.257 Most importantly, “conditional 
refugee” status holders are not offered the prospect of long-term legal integration in 
Turkey and excluded from “family unification” rights.  
Persons who do not fulfil the eligibility criteria for either “refugee” status or 
“conditional refugee” status are given “subsidiary protection” status under LFIO. 
This fully replicates the subsidiary protection definition provided by the EU 
Qualification Directive. Similar to the “conditional refugee” status holders, 
“subsidiary protection” beneficiaries receive a lesser set of rights and entitlements as 
compared to “refugee” status holders and are barred from long-term legal integration 
in Turkey.  
Therefore, the Turkish “temporary protection” concept and “subsidiary 
protection” in their current forms falls short of promising a secure, long-term 
solution to refugees from Syria and other protection seekers seeking safety in 
Turkey, while it does create a framework for addressing the immediate and short-
term protection and humanitarian needs of beneficiaries.258  
The LFIP, in addition to laying down these eligibility grounds for asylum in 
Turkey, also provides, for the first time in Turkey, a full-fledged “international 
protection” application and determination procedure, complete with basic procedural 
safeguards, including guarantees on access to legal representatives and to UNHCR 
and new legal remedies that secure applicants’ right to stay in Turkey until the full 
exhaustion of the procedure. 259 
Although the law makes sure that Turkey complies with international standards 
on refugee rights and is largely based on EU migration and asylum acquis – albeit 
with some notably exceptions, including the “geographical limitation” policy - the 
law is quite new and the migration control system created with it untested. According 
to AIDA, it is therefore important to observe that the new asylum procedure design 
provided by the LFIP does not yet fully correspond to the reality on the ground.260  
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4.2 Potential Protection Concerns  
This subchapter will highlight voiced concerns - raised primarily by international 
NGO’s - relevant for the assessment whether or not the actual conditions and 
practices in Turkey complies with relevant international standards.  
4.2.1 Concerns related to the implementation of 
the LFIP 
Concerns have been voiced that the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
will take years to be implemented and that there are not enough training for 
personnel implementing the law with respect to human rights and refugee law.261 The 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, François Crépeau, noted 
in a report for the UNHCR that although the law represents a major step towards a 
comprehensive migration framework, it still requires coordinated effort across 
multiple agencies and ministries for successful implementation, which has been an 
issue in the past.262                                       
 The law has also drawn strong disapproval for not removing the geographical 
limitation on refugee status, which critics believe is crucial to providing full-
coverage international protection. Amnesty International has criticized the limitation 
in Turkey, claiming it forces “most (conditional refugees to) live in destitution and/or 
work illegally in exploitative conditions.” 263 Human Rights Watch Director Bill 
Frelick writes that any Syrian, Iraqi, or Afghan returned to Turkey would not be 
allowed to request refugee status there, as required by the APD, because Turkey 
excludes non-Europeans from qualifying for refugee status.264 
The Refugee Solidarity Network has further derided the maintenance of the 
geographical limitation as preventing refugees from seeking long-term relief in 
Turkey. In 2012 the Chairman of the refugee-rights non--profit Mülteci-Der was 
quoted as saying, “Overall it is a good law, but in my view as long as the 
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geographical limitation is maintained, it remains problematic.” 265 
4.2.2  Incidents of refoulement  
The APD also requires the safe third country to respect the principle of non-
refoulement. That principle not only forbids governments from deporting refugees to 
places where their lives or freedom would be threatened but also from rejecting 
asylum seekers at their borders who would face such threats. At the very time the EU 
was announcing the EU/Turkey deal, Turkey had closed its border to a hughe amount 
of Syrians fleeing the war in the Syrian city Aleppo, a “massive and egregious 
flouting of this norm of customary international law”, according to Human Rights 
Watch Director Bill Frelick.266 He continues by stating that Syrians for whom Turkey 
offers temporary protection, and other nationalities with even less protection, should 
be able to challenge whether Turkey provides them effective protection before being 
sent back there.267   
Amnesty268 has reported that since September persons attempting to cross the 
Greek-Turkish land border have been detained, many herd onto buses and 
transported to isolated detention centres far away, where they have been held 
incommunicado. A Human Rights Watch269 report highlighted how Syrians are being 
denied entry to Turkey at the border and being pushed back to Syria. These reports, 
while they mainly entail allegations that problematize the shortcomings of Turkey’s 
“temporary protection” regime for refugees from Syria, they also generally indicate 
alleged practices in detention facilities and border regions that do not comply with 
the rule of law framework and basic procedural safeguards from arbitrariness 
established by LFIP.270  
According to a recent Amnesty special report271, there have been illegal mass 
returns of Syrian refugees, which expose fatal flaws in the EU/Turkey deal. Its 
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reported that new research carried out in Turkey’s southern border provinces 
suggests that Turkish authorities have been rounding up and expelling groups of 
around 100 Syrian men, women and children to Syria on a near-daily basis since 
mid-January 2016. “In their desperation to seal their borders, EU leaders have 
wilfully ignored the simplest of facts: Turkey is not a safe country for Syrian 
refugees and is getting less safe by the day. It seems highly likely that Turkey has 
returned several thousand refugees to Syria in the last seven to nine weeks272. If the 
agreement proceeds as planned, there is a very real risk that some of those the EU 
sends back to Turkey will suffer the same fate.” said John Dalhuisen, Amnesty 
International’s Director for Europe and Central Asia. The recent research further 
shows that the Turkish authorities have scaled back the registration of Syrian 
refugees in the southern border provinces. 
Continuing, ECRE strongly opposes declaring Turkey as  “safe” in a report 
from January 2016. Beside concern for the protection of Syrian refugees, ECRE 
states that asylum seekers from other nationalities face a largely dysfunctional 
asylum system under Turkey’s international protection procedure. Despite recent 
reforms, the protection system is still in the early stages of building the necessary 
capacities to implement the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. 
Numerous barriers to state-funded legal aid, coupled with resource constraints on 
NGOs, leave asylum seekers without legal representation and advice. The 
increasingly hostile climate for human rights protection in the country, for foreigners 
as well as the country’s own citizens, is also a concern.273 
 
4.2.3 Access to seek asylum 
 
International and European human rights and refugee law requires, as we remember, 
that a person can be returned to an intermediary country as long as they are 
guaranteed effective access to protection. Some argue however that this may not be 
the case in Turkey.  
The Law on Foreigners and International Protection grants all basic human 
rights to migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in line with EU legislation: access to 
legal counselling and a lawyer, prohibition of torture and ill treatment, extended 
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country”,(29 January 2016). 
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protection, rights for minors, and so on. However, according to Orcun Ulusoy - a 
human rights lawyer from Turkey and a founding member of Multeci-Der - the well 
drafted law hasn’t provided nor guaranteed basic human rights for migrants, asylum 
seekers, and refugees in Turkey. This failure has several reasons he argues: First, the 
newly established responsible authority - Directorate General of Migration 
Management - lacks capacity and experience. Second, the Syrian Refugee influx 
created pressure on the newly established system. Third, there is not enough juridical 
capacity. Fourth, a retroactive migration management tradition and security based 
approach to migration in Turkey is still dominant.274 He further describes the Turkish 
asylum system as: “Inexperienced, under-equipped, under-trained, and under the 
wrong influences, this system is far away from providing a safe haven for migrants 
and refugees. Today, it’s only creating a legal limbo where migrants and asylum 
seekers are waiting without seeing their futures.”275 
Amnesty International released a report in March 2016 claiming that asylum 
seekers and refugees are denied access to fair and efficient procedures for the 
determination of their status in Turkey. 276  The report follow Ulusoy’s line of 
argument and states that Turkey’s asylum system is still in the process of being 
established, and is not capable of coping with the millions of asylum-seekers and 
refugees in the country. All the available evidence indicates that many crucial aspects 
of the country’s new asylum system, as set out in the LFIP are not operating in 
practice.277 The Report also highlights potential flaws regarding the quality of the 
decision-making, and concludes that the Turkish authorities are not consistently 
fulfilling the procedural fairness provisions set out in the LFIP.278 Concrete concerns 
are e.g. the speed at which the 30,000 decisions reportedly made in April 2016 that 
raises serious doubts about their quality, and the very low number of cases to reach 
the courts that raises serious doubts about access to review procedures. 279 These 
concerns about detainees’ access to fair procedures are particularly salient in the 
context of the EU/Turkey Deal, given that most of the people returned from Greece 
under the terms of the deal have been detained,280 and some denied access to legal 
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protection in Turkey, (March 2016).  
277 ibid. p.15 
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DCR/ECRE Desk Research on Application of a Safe Third Country and a First Country of 
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representation – including at a detention camp in Düziçi in Osmaniye province.281 
This is a facility where Amnesty International research in late 2015 showed that 
people were being pressured – or actually forced – to return to a risk of serious 
human rights violations in Iraq and Syria.282 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
Despite the positive steps taken by the Turkey in order to introduce a fair and 
efficient asylum system in accordance with international human rights and refugee 
standards, the above examination shows that there are many that argue that that this 
has not been achieved so far. The asylum system is characterized by multiple 
deficiencies, including its dual structure and maintenance of a “geographical 
limitation” to the Refugee Convention, routine pushbacks, lack of procedural 
safeguards during the asylum procedure and access to effective remedies in law and 
in practice. My analysis was based on various publicly available reports of national 
and international organizations. 
Although the Turkish law – LFIP – also provides for a legal framework for 
processing asylum applications of “non-Europeans” and establishes an administrative 
authority competent to deal with such applicants, it is clear that it is still in the 
starting blocks of establishing the necessary institutional capacity and is currently 
unable to cope with the increased numbers of persons seeking protection. Many 
essential safeguards that should be afforded to protection seekers seems many times 
to be inaccessible to them in practice – raising questions if there is a gap between 
what is required under the law and the actual practices.  
In light of the considerations outlined in this chapter, it makes it hard to argue 
that the situation in Turkey is satisfactory from a safe third country perspective.  
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5 Is the deal in compliance with 
refugee law and human rights 
law? 
 
The primary question for this analyse is whether refugees' access to protection might 
be impaired under the EU/Turkey deal. I will connect the findings in previous 
chapters and analyse whether or not the EU/Turkey deal reflect at least the minimum 
requirements prescribed by the international refugee and human rights law examined, 
and do not suggest anything which falls short of that standard. The focus has been on 
the Refugee Convention, the ECHR, UDHR and relevant EU Law - why these are 
covered in this analyse.  
I would like to begin to emphasize that in studying the relationship between the 
EU/Turkey deal and international and regional law, states cannot contract out their 
pre-existing obligations under international refugee and human rights law by 
concluding a subsequent agreement.  
Important is also that the EU/Turkey deal does not provide the legal basis for 
rejecting asylum seekers, but only facilitates the execution of an expulsion 
decision.  The deal cannot therefore per se violate international human rights law or 
refugee law. The legal basis for the rapid return of asylum seekers under the 
EU/Turkey deal is the safe third country exception enshrined in the APD. Under this, 
Greek authorities are entitled to return someone to Turkey if the person’s asylum 
request is found inadmissible on the basis that for that individual, Turkey is a safe 
third country, meaning that the person can receive effective protection there. The 
effect of the inadmissibility is primarily that the authorities in Greece are not 
required to conduct a substantive examination of protection claims. Important to 
remember when appraisal the APD, is that it purports to minimum standards only, 
drafted in very general terms. This means that member states are always free to adopt 
higher standards of protection.   
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5.1 The EU/Turkey deal and refoulement   
My starting point in this analysis, is that the ability of a country in which an 
application is lodged (continuing Greece) to return protection seekers to an 
intermediate country (continuing Turkey) is subject to limitations under the non-
refoulement principle. Taking into consideration the conclusions drawn in previous 
chapters, the safe third country exception – as a matter of principle - is compatible 
with the international legal framework.  In other words, Greece is allowed to return 
protection seekers entering its territory, back to Turkey as long as required legal 
safeguards are attached. In principle, return is in conformity with the prohibition on 
refoulement, even if no substantive examination of the asylum request has been made 
in Greece, as long as it has been established that Turkey will provide protection if 
necessary. So, while it must be concluded that returning protection seekers under the 
EU/Turkey deal is not necessarily prohibited under the legal framework examined, 
the prohibition on refoulement of refugees to their country of origin “in any manner 
whatsoever” under the Refugee Convention, implies a prohibition to return them to 
an intermediate country where they will not be protected against refoulement.  
If we turn to the European context and the ECtHR’s case law, it is evident that 
it proposes a rebuttable presumption that states will abide by their international 
obligations. However, derived especially from the Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy case, if there 
are indications that a potential intermediate country has violated human rights law, 
the presumption can no longer apply. A state cannot knowingly send someone back 
to a place where he/she will experience harm. This conclusion would be in line with 
Legomsky´s complicity principle.     
In sum, if Greek authorities decides not to examine the substance of the 
request, as proposed by the EU/Turkey deal, the authorities must treat the migrant as 
if a refugee under the Refugee Convention or as if there is a real risk of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment under the ECHR. This derives from the fact that 
refugee status is declaratory rather than constitutive. Hence, Greece must assume that 
its obligations under international law are involved if returning the applicant to 
Turkey. Taking into consideration the scope of the non-refoulement principle as 
carefully reviewed in previous chapters, this implies that even people who invoke the 
prohibition on refoulement in their request can be returned to a Turkey if they will be 
protected against refoulement there.  
However, an essential finding from the M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece case 
(especially in connection to the EU/Turkey deal as I will demonstrate) is that the 
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removing country cannot return someone, knowing that there is no guarantee that his 
asylum application would be seriously examined in the third country. Emphasized 
has also been that even if a country seems generally safe, a person who invokes the 
prohibition on refoulement must always be able to rebut the presumption that the 
third country really is safe in his/hers individual case. Providing for the possibility of 
individual safety determination is thus not a fully discretionary choice under the 
international obligations of the member states. 
The ECtHR has been stating that  “adequate safeguards” and “sufficient 
guarantees” is what must be provided for in the intermediate country, and the 
returning state can never - “in any manner whatsoever” – knowingly breach the 
prohibition on refoulement under the Refugee Convention. Essential is therefore to 
establish that the intermediary country will offer effective protection from 
refoulement (that is, to the full personal scope of those prohibitions), however that 
the applicant must have the substance of the request examined is not required. 
Nevertheless, an effective procedure where the request is assessed in accordance with 
prevailing international standards, makes the non-refoulement principle most likely 
to be observed.  
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence indicates that all migrants must be given a realistic 
opportunity to request asylum and this claim must be examined on an individual 
basis. To remove without a “rigorous” and “independent” examination of the asylum 
claim is itself contrary to the prohibition on refoulement as we saw in the Jabari v. 
Turkey case. However, if a safe third country is established it can be relevant for the 
outcome of the examination. In the context of the EU/Turkey deal this means; when 
a migrant enters Greece, he/she must be able to request asylum there. If the request is 
declared inadmissible under the safe third country exception, he/she must be given a 
real opportunity to invoke the prohibition on refoulement. A proper individual 
examination on the substance of the request must then be carried out whether Turkey 
actually is safe for this particular individual.   
In sum, there must exist adequate safeguards against the risk of returning a 
protection contrary to the prohibition on refoulement. International law does not 
specify any procedures to this end.283 This is however provided for in the APD (and 
domestic legal systems, outside the scope of this thesis). The obvious question is 
whether these minimum standards suggest anything that falls short of the 
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requirements can be deduced from Article 3. However, as I conclude that APD confirm 
international standards, I assume from this.  
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international protection. My research shows that is not the case, Article 38 APD puts 
up no obstacles for the member states to adhere to their international obligations 
when implementing the safe third country provision. In two aspects the APD even 
provide more far-reaching protection than required under international law. Firstly, 
that refugees should enjoy the secondary rights laid down in the Refugee Convention 
– this is however in compliance with Article 18 EU Charter, recognizing “a right to 
asylum”, absent under international human rights and refugee law. This implies that 
someone with “a right to asylum” may not be returned without guaranteed basic 
human rights standards in the intermediate country. Secondly, that a protection 
seeker must have a previous “connection” with the intermediate country is not a 
requirement under international law either.  
So, up until now the EU/Turkey deal arouses no legal problems. However, 
taking into consideration the actual conditions and practices in Turkey examined in 
chapter 4, far less certain is whether Turkey actually meets the statutory threshold 
under the APD. The formal effectiveness may also be prejudiced by restrictions on 
access, for example, because of its geographical limitations on the extent of 
obligations. The simple agreement of legal (international/national) instruments does 
not equate to compliance with the required standards, which requires substantive and 
procedural guarantees for protection. This is an interpretation in line with Gregor 
Noll’s empirical approach.  
Following this general discussion of the legal principles guiding the analysis of 
return under the EU/Turkey deal, we will therefore look at the implications when 
implementing the deal and especially Turkey as a safe third country.  
 
5.2 Implementation of the EU/Turkey deal 
and Turkey as a safe third country    
To begin with, the deal explicitly states: "all irregular migrants will be returned to 
Turkey". This is problematic because it raises the prospect of collective expulsion, 
which is prohibited by the EU Charter, Protocol 4 Article 4 of the ECHR and related 
jurisprudence and also breaches the right to seek asylum. To state that “all new 
irregular migrants” will be returned is an obvious breach of this legislation. As 
thoroughly examined, such practice has been condemned by the ECtHR in the Hirsi 
Jamaa v Italy case. Consequently, the crucial question for migrants entering Greece 
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is whether they will be given an opportunity to apply for asylum, as required under 
ECtHR’s case law, as well as under the EU Charter, UDHR and APD. Despite the 
provision that “all irregular migrants will be returned to Turkey", to return without 
possibility to request protection is probably not really the intention, as the rest of the 
paragraph, including the reference to non-refoulement, completely contradicts that. 
Nothing in my review indicates that migrants are hindered from applying for asylum 
in Greece under the EU/Turkey deal. What difference does this make however, if 
their application is declared inadmissible under the safe third country exception? 
This is important because he/she is thus entitled to rebut the safety of Turkey in 
his/hers case. The EU/Turkey deal explicitly confirms that “migrants arriving in the 
Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be 
processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum 
Procedures Directive”. A further analyse of the legal and factual situation in Greece 
is beyond the scope of my research and will not take place here. I will just mention 
that in light of recent changes to Greek law, a careful examination of the legislation 
will be necessary to assess its compliance with international and EU law and its 
application in practice. Essential is that the Greek authorities have the required 
procedural guarantees in place and provides for an individual examination in 
accordance with international standards as outlined above. 
Returning to the substance of the EU/Turkey deal, it further contains a non-
affection clause confirming that the deal will "take place in full accordance with EU 
and international law". Together with the fact that it simply constitutes a purely 
administrative tool serving the purpose of smoothing the final stage of the return 
procedure for asylum seekers whose claims will be examined elsewhere, I would 
argue that no issue of incompatibility with the non-refoulement principle and the 
right to seek asylum stem from the technical content of the deal. 
Nevertheless, once we take the actual conditions and practices in Turkey into 
consideration, the relationship between the EU/Turkey deal and refugee rights turns 
out not to be that coherent and consistent. The implementation enhances the risk of 
direct and indirect refoulement and may lead to violations of the right to seek asylum 
as a consequence of asylum seeker's transfer to Turkey. My argumentation assume 
from that potential incompatibilities of the EU/Turkey deal with the right to seek 
asylum and protection against refoulement is mainly due to deficiency of the 
domestic asylum system in Turkey, rather than to the existence of specific provisions 
within the EU/Turkey deal. 
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So, besides the issues that we have focused on so far, the crucial substantive 
question in relation to the EU/Turkey deal is: does Turkey comply with the 
requirements of effective access to asylum procedures? Can Turkey be considered a 
safe third country? A country where: asylum seekers do not have their life or liberty 
threatened on ground of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion;284 there is “no risk of serious harm”;285 the applicant won’t 
be sent to another, “fourth”, country which is unsafe;286 and “the possibility exists to 
request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in 
accordance with the Refugee Convention”. 
In light of Article 78 TEU together with relevant provisions under the EU 
Charter,287 Article 38 APD require that the applicant have a possibility to apply for 
international protection, and if recognized, will be able to enjoy effective protection 
in Turkey. To the question whether Turkey can ensure access to effective asylum 
procedures for all persons in need of international protection, there are a number of 
reasons for doubt. First, while Turkey is a signatory to the Refugee Convention, it 
adopted a geographical limitation whereby only refugees from European states are 
entitled to full protection; for all others, Turkey may grant limited or “temporary 
protection” in the form of temporary status. Accordingly, any non-Europeans cannot 
fall within the scope of Article 38 APD because they cannot request nor be given 
refugee status in conformity with Refugee Convention in Turkey. It is from this 
limitation much of the concern regarding whether Turkey respects the principle of 
non-refoulement stems. This is because the APD explicitly states that the safe third 
country must respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the 
Refugee Convention. Whether or not it is required that the third state has actually 
ratified the Convention, for example to comply in good faith with one’s obligations, 
are there different opinions about. I assume from that important seems to be that it de 
facto adhere to the listed obligations and not the formal ratification. Much depends 
therefore on the meaning of the words “in accordance with” the Refugee Convention. 
Whether Turkey does apply equivalent standards in practice is open to question. 
Even if LFIP created an international protection system that allows individual asylum 
seekers to seek "conditional refugee status" and protections in line with the Refugee 
Convention, non-Europeans are excluded from it because the temporary protection 
                                                
284 See Refugee Convention Article 33 
285 See the definition of subsidiary protection in QD Article 15 (death penalty, torture etc, 
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plus as laid down by ECHR case law. 
287 Articles 4, 18 and 19. 
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regulation that governs their status is explicitly outside the scope of that system. 
Consequently, the geographical limitation provides a barrier to accessing asylum 
procedures for example a Syrian, Afghani or Iraqi.  
As chapter 4.2 demonstrated, observers have raised concerns over Turkey’s 
treatment of refugees and ability to guarantee effective access to protection. These 
concerns include the lack of local capacity to process migrants and implement proper 
individual status determinations, especially considering the size of the influx, the 
lack of juridical capacity to review asylum cases and the possibility of individuals 
being subsequently deported from Turkey to their country of origin, based on recent 
reports of "large scale returns" or push-backs of refugees from Turkey to Syria. 
These practices are in clear violation of the non-refoulement principle.  
Emphasized throughout this thesis has been that an assessment must be 
available to rebut whether it would be safe for that particular applicant to be 
removed to a particular country - a general consideration of non-refoulement would 
not appear to be the relevant test in such case. However, if the requested state is not 
complying in general with this standard, this should warn the sending state that its 
potential partner is actually not safe for returnees. Similarly, under the ECHR - both 
general and personal circumstances are relevant for the risk assessment when 
evalutaing real risk of ill-treatment. 
Much points to that Turkey does not have a fully developed asylum procedures 
in place and take worryingly narrow views of the substantive eligibility criteria for 
refugee status. Overall the EU/Turkey deal emphasizes that the EU law will be 
applied to those entering Greece, and that Turkey must meet the statutory threshold 
under the APD when taking people back. Nevertheless, the technical “legality” 
approach is clearly undermined by the actual conditions and practices in Turkey.  
I conclude that there are indications that many crucial aspects of Turkey's 
asylum system, as set out in LFIP, are not operating in practice. The EU/Turkey deal 
in itself does not however contain any provision directly violating any international 
human rights or refugee rights, especially not the right to seek asylum or non-
refoulement. The key legal question will therefore be how the commitments under 
the EU/Turkey deal are implemented in practice.  
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6 Conclusion  
This thesis has identified the main protection concerns regarding the EU/Turkey deal 
on 18 March 2016. My analysis above demonstrate general concerns over the fact 
that protection seekers and refugees are returned to Turkey today, as the actual 
conditions and practices raise serious doubts whether Turkey really can be consider a  
“safe” third country for return. As the conditions by which to determine “safety” are 
delimited by international and EU obligations, this thesis has identified a series of 
obligations stemming from the non-refoulement principle and right to seek asylum in 
international human rights and refugee law and EU law, relevant to the return of 
protection seekers from EU member states to intermediate countries. A conclusion of 
the outcome of this analysis, constituting the international legal framework can be 
found in chapter 2.3.  In sum, the state contemplating protection elsewhere, does not 
have to give full access to its asylum procedures in each and every case. It can to a 
certain extent rely on generic safety determinations that the requirement of effective 
protection is fulfilled. However, it must always allow for rebuttal from the part of the 
protection seeker. The safe third country exception under the APD appears to be in 
line with the international protection obligations of the Member States, although a 
restrictive interpretation thereof. This means that to return protection seekers, who 
are rejected under that policy, cannot in principle be said to suggest anything that 
falls short of designated standards.   
This thesis has made clear that burden sharing agreements such as the 
EU/Turkey deal, takes place in a conflict between internal security, which 
emphasizes the need to tighten up territorial borders and to fight illegal immigration, 
and the liberal frame of humanitarianism, which incorporates the human rights-based 
notions of the rights of individuals to receive protection and to have access to 
equitable asylum procedures. I asked myself in the introduction whether the 
EU/Turkey deal put too much emphasis on control and thereby falls short of 
complying with international human rights and refugee standards? A thorough 
analysis of this question can be found in chapter 4. In sum, I conclude that no 
inconsistencies stem from the technical content of the deal itself. This conclusion 
derives primary from the finding that the EU/Turkey deal does not provide the legal 
basis for return of protection seekers, it is an administrative tool facilitating the 
return. It would be the return-decision under national law on safe third country 
grounds that potentially could breach designated standards. Secondly, the non-
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affection clauses safeguards compliance with designated obligations. After a detailed 
review of the safe third country exceptions in the APD, I came to the conclusion that 
the safe third country exception, in principle, is in conformity with the international 
legal framework.  
I recognize that a comprehensive understanding of the impact the EU/Turkey 
deal would require further research, especially in relation to informal border practice 
in Turkey and in Greece. Nevertheless, caution should be observed that although in 
the strict legal sense the EU/Turkey deal is not a problem, my study indicates that the 
actual conditions and practices in relation to international obligations in Turkey 
could be a cause for concern if returning protection seekers there. It is indicated that 
international protection obligations are not strictly adhered to and flaws in the 
implementation of asylum procedures as well as direct human rights violations. 
There are grounds to assume that Turkey today does not live up to the requirements 
of a safe third country.  
As a concluding observation, it is sad to see that the EU member states, in 
order to solve one of the biggest human rights issues of today given the numbers of 
people in need of protection, cannot cooperate so as to share this responsibility across 
the whole Union and stand united for people risking their lives for the sake of 
protection.  
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Annex 1 
EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016 288 
Today the Members of the European Council met with their Turkish counterpart. 
This was the third meeting since November 2015 dedicated to deepening Turkey-EU 
relations as well as addressing the migration crisis. 
 
The Members of the European Council expressed their deepest condolences to the 
people of Turkey following the bomb attack in Ankara on Sunday. They strongly 
condemned this heinous act and reiterated their continued support to fight terrorism 
in all its forms. 
 
Turkey and the European Union reconfirmed their commitment to the 
implementation of their joint action plan activated on 29 November 2015. Much 
progress has been achieved already, including Turkey's opening of its labour market 
to Syrians under temporary protection, the introduction of new visa requirements for 
Syrians and other nationalities, stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard 
and police and enhanced information sharing. Moreover, the European Union has 
begun disbursing the 3 billion euro of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey for 
concrete projects and work has advanced on visa liberalisation and in the accession 
talks, including the opening of Chapter 17 last December. On 7 March 2016, Turkey 
furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of 
international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all 
irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Turkey and the EU also agreed to 
continue stepping up measures against migrant smugglers and welcomed the 
establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea. At the same time Turkey and 
the EU recognise that further, swift and determined efforts are needed. 
 
In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an 
alternative to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today decided to end the 
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irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. In order to achieve this goal, they agreed 
on the following additional action points: 
 
1) All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 
March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with 
EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All 
migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and 
in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and 
extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore 
public order. Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any 
application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in 
accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. 
Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or 
inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey. Turkey 
and Greece, assisted by EU institutions and agencies, will take the necessary steps 
and agree any necessary bilateral arrangements, including the presence of Turkish 
officials on Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016, to 
ensure liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these arrangements. 
The costs of the return operations of irregular migrants will be covered by the EU. 
 
2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will 
be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. 
A mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU 
agencies and other Member States, as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this 
principle will be implemented as from the same day the returns start. Priority will be 
given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU 
irregularly. On the EU side, resettlement under this mechanism will take place, in the 
first instance, by honouring the commitments taken by Member States in the 
conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of Member States meeting within 
the Council on 20 July 2015, of which 18.000 places for resettlement remain. Any 
further need for resettlement will be carried out through a similar voluntary 
arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54.000 persons. The Members of the 
European Council welcome the Commission's intention to propose an amendment to 
the relocation decision of 22 September 2015 to allow for any resettlement 
commitment undertaken in the framework of this arrangement to be offset from non-
allocated places under the decision. Should these arrangements not meet the 
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objective of ending the irregular migration and the number of returns come close to 
the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be reviewed. Should the 
number of returns exceed the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be 
discontinued. 
 
3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for 
illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with 
neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect. 
 
4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have 
been substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme will be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to 
this scheme. 
 
5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all 
participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish 
citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been 
met. To this end Turkey will take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining 
requirements to allow the Commission to make, following the required assessment of 
compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal by the end of April on the 
basis of which the European Parliament and the Council can make a final decision. 
 
6) The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement 
of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and 
ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified 
with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects 
for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other 
living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified 
within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the 
above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility 
of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018. 
 
7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing  work on the upgrading of the 
Customs Union. 
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8) The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession 
process as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the 
opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open 
Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission 
will put forward a proposal to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening 
of other Chapters will continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member 
States' positions in accordance with the existing rules. 
 
9) The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to 
improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the 
Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in 
areas which will be more safe. 
All these elements will be taken forward in parallel and monitored jointly on a 
monthly basis. 
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